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Abstract
Disparities in economic outcomes among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups
continue to be serious concerns in most economies. Relative economic standings of diﬀerent
groups are rather persistent, although some groups initially in disadvantaged positions
successfully caught up with then-advantaged groups. Two obstacles, costly skill investment
and negative stereotypes or discriminations in the labor market, seem to distort investment
and sectoral decisions and slow down the economic progress of the disadvantaged.
How do these obstacles aﬀect skill investment and sectoral choices of individuals of
diﬀerent groups and the dynamics of their economic outcomes and inter-group inequality?
Is aﬃrmative action necessary to signiﬁcantly improve conditions of the disadvantaged, or
redistributive policies suﬃcient? In order to tackle these questions, this paper develops a
dynamic model of statistical discrimination and examines how initial economic standings
of groups and initial institutionalized discrimination aﬀect subsequent dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Disparities in economic outcomes among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups continue
to be serious concerns in most economies. Relative economic standings of diﬀerent groups are
rather persistent (Borjas, 1994; Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey, 2001),1 although some groups
initially in disadvantaged positions successfully caught up with then-advantaged groups.
Two obstacles seem to slow down the economic progress of the disadvantaged. One is costly
skill investment: the quality of public schools is not adequate in many countries, thus many
people expend on supplementary study materials and tutoring or attend high-quality but
costly private schools (Baker et al., 2001; Bray and Kwok, 2003).2 The other is negative
stereotypes or discriminations in the labor market, which compels many from disadvantaged
groups to invest less in skill or to choose occupations or sectors where performance is less
aﬀected by such handicaps but earnings tend to be lower than those occupied by dominant
groups (Telles, 1993; Bayard et al., 1999; van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001).3
How do these obstacles aﬀect skill investment and sectoral choices of individuals of dif-
ferent groups and the dynamics of their economic outcomes and inter-group inequality?
Is aﬃrmative action necessary to signiﬁcantly improve conditions of the disadvantaged, or
redistributive policies suﬃcient? In order to tackle these questions, this paper develops a
dynamic model of statistical discrimination and examines how initial economic standings of
groups and initial institutionalized discrimination aﬀect subsequent dynamics.
The analysis is based on a discrete-time small-open OLG model. There exist a continuum
of two-period-lived individuals who belong to one of two ethnic (racial, religious) groups and
are homogeneous in innate ability. In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her
parent and spends it on assets and skill investment needed to become a skilled worker. No
1Borjas (1994) shows that a U.S. worker’s wage in 1940 and 1980 is signiﬁcantly related to the average
wage of immigrants of the worker’s ethnic group (blacks are excluded) in 1910, after individual characteristics
are controlled for. Darity, Dietrich, and Guilkey (2001) ﬁnd that a U.S. worker’s occupational status in 1980
and 1990 is signiﬁcantly related to human capital endowments and the degree of favorable or unfavorable
treatment in the labor market in the period between 1880 and 1910 of his/her group.
2Baker et al. (2001) ﬁnd that about 40% of seven and eight graders in a large sample from 41 developed
and developing countries participate weekly in private supplementary tutoring, such as tutoring sessions and
cram schools, to study mathematics. Further, at the national level, they ﬁnd that the average participation
rate is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the percentage of public expenditure on education in GNP. Bray
and Kwok (2003) brieﬂy review existing studies, which show that the use of private tutoring is extensive
even among primary school students in developing countries.
3Telles (1993) ﬁnds, in Brazilian metropolitan areas, that minorities (except Asians) are overrepresented
in low-wage informal-sector jobs in which being minorities has less negative eﬀects on earnings. For the
Vietnam economy, van de Walle and Gunewardena (2001) show that, compared to the majority Kinh, returns
to education are lower but returns to land are higher for minorities, suggesting that minorities choose to
exert more eﬀorts on farming in which performance is less aﬀected by their disadvantaged positions. For
the U.S. economy, Bayard et al. (1999) ﬁnd that greater racial and ethnic wage disparities for men than for
women can be explained largely by more severe occupational and industry-level segregation among men.
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credit market exists for skill investment, so she cannot invest if the transfer is not enough.
Since she can spend wealth on assets too, she invests in skill only if it is aﬀordable and
proﬁtable. In adulthood, she chooses a sector to work (detailed next), obtains income from
assets and work, and spends it on consumption and a transfer to her single child.
The economy is composed of up to two production sectors, the primary sector with ad-
vanced technology and the secondary sector with backward technology. The primary and
the secondary sectors correspond to formal/modern and informal/traditional sectors in de-
veloping economies, while in advanced economies, typical secondary-sector jobs would be
neighborhood jobs of small businesses. Skilled and unskilled workers are perfectly substi-
tutable in both sectors. In real economy, labor and product markets of the primary sector
tend to be ethnically more mixed than the secondary sector. In the integrated primary
sector, minorities are prone to face disadvantages in production or suﬀer greater disutility of
work, because prevalent language, customs, taste, code of conduct, and culture are diﬀerent
from theirs, or they are discriminated non-statistically. Hence, skill investment is assumed
to raise human capital in the secondary sector equally for both groups, while its eﬀect on
human capital in the primary sector, where skilled workers have comparative advantages,
may be smaller for the minority. Main implications of the model, however, remain intact
without this assumption: it is imposed for analytical simplicity as well as for reality.
In the primary sector, due to complex production processes and organizational structures,
evaluating each worker’s contribution to output tends to be diﬃcult. Accurate evaluations
are particularly diﬃcult at least initially, if a worker and her evaluators belong to diﬀerent
groups due to the above-mentioned inter-group diﬀerences.4 Similarly, qualiﬁcations of a
job applicant tend to be assessed less precisely when interviewers are from other groups.
Hence, the wage is assumed to depend partly on her human capital and partly on its signal,
the average human capital (the average wage) of her group in the sector, and the signal’s
importance decreases with the share of her group in the sector’s skilled workers.5 In the
secondary sector, typically, each worker’s contribution is easy to measure or workers in the
workplace belong to the same group, thus wage equals human capital.6
Wealth in the initial period is unequally distributed over the population, and the in-
4Classic models of statistical discrimination by Aigner and Cain (1977) and Lundberg and Startz (1983)
are based on a similar idea. See footnotes 16 and 17 for evidence consistent with this and the next claim.
5Like other models of statistical discrimination, it is implicitly supposed that education level is not a good
signal, which implies that the model is concerned with an economy where the quality of public schools is not
adequate or varies greatly across schools and thus many people expend on supplementary study materials
and tutoring or attend private schools, which, as mentioned at the beginning, is the case in many countries.
Skill investment of the model may be interpreted as spendings on these activities.
6The wage equations can be derived from proﬁt maximization problems of ﬁrms that hire workers and
physical capital for production (see footnote 20). Further, productivity growth can be incorporated without
aﬀecting results qualitatively, as long as the cost of skill investment is assumed to grow proportionately.
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equality is transmitted intergenerationally through transfers. Hence, generally, individuals
are heterogeneous in accessibility to skill investment, and those without enough wealth do
not invest even if it is proﬁtable. Their descendants, however, may become accessible if
enough wealth is accumulated. (The opposite is true for oﬀspring of non-poor agents.)
An important property of the model is that skill investment and sectoral choices of
diﬀerent individuals within and across groups could be interrelated, because a worker’s wage
in the primary sector depends on her group’s average human capital in the sector (also called
the group’s reputation) and the reputation’s importance in the wage (also called the degree
of prejudice toward the group), which decreases with the group’s share in the sector’s skilled
workers. Hence, the dynamics of transfers and economic positions of diﬀerent people too
could be interrelated. The paper examines how the initial distribution of wealth within and
across groups aﬀects the dynamics of skill investment, sectoral choices, intra and intergroup
disparities, and the steady state outcome.
Main results are summarized as follows. First, sectoral choices and skill investment
may not be socially optimal. Even if unskilled workers are less productive in the primary
sector,7 they may choose the sector due to a positive eﬀect from skilled workers through the
reputation. Individuals may not carry out productive investment due to the negative eﬀect
from unskilled workers. For a similar reason, it is possible that all skilled workers of a group
choose the secondary sector and all unskilled workers choose the primary sector, even if the
former have comparative advantages and are more productive in the primary sector.
Second, multiple equilibria could exist regarding skill investment and sectoral choices of
skilled workers: both the non-poor of a group invest (skilled workers choose the primary
sector) and do not could be equilibria. Within a group, the source of multiplicity is strategic
complementarity: to take the investment as an example, as more people invest and get
skilled, prejudice toward the group eases, primary-sector wages reﬂect human capital more
closely, and the return to investment rises. Across groups, strategic substitutability is at
work: as more people of one group invest, prejudice toward the other group intensiﬁes and
their return to investment falls. Hence, if the latter eﬀect is strong for both groups, either
group invest (choose the primary sector) and the other do not are equilibria; if the former
eﬀect too is strong for both, both invest (choose the sector) is also an equilibrium.
Third, the dynamics and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of the minority,
depend greatly on initial conditions and could be quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free”
economy. Since good (bad) reputation tends to beget good (bad) reputation, a group starting
7Individuals, particularly the minority, could be less productive in the primary sector if the quality of
formal institutions and thus the sector’s productivity are low, if non-statistical discrimination exists, or if
the disutility of work is greater in the sector (human capital may be measured net of the disutility).
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with a good (bad) initial condition, i.e. a high (low) fraction of them can aﬀord skill
investment initially, tend to be in a good (bad) position in the long run.
The mechanism is explained based on an economy in which workers always choose the
primary sector and oﬀspring of the unskilled majority become accessible to skill investment
over time (analyzed in Section 5.1.1). If the minority’s initial condition is good and thus
a relatively large fraction of them are skilled initially, the wage of the unskilled minority is
relatively high because of the group’s good reputation. Further, as the majority increasingly
become skilled, the reputation becomes more important, which has a positive eﬀect on the
wage. As a result, the unskilled minority accumulate relatively large wealth, and some of
their oﬀspring come to aﬀord investment at some point. The number of the skilled minority
and the reputation start to rise, and the improved reputation stimulates the upward mobility
of the unskilled further. In the long run, all workers are skilled. If the initial condition is
bad, the similar mechanism aﬀects the skilled minority negatively, and the minority are
totally unskilled in the end. Inter-group inequality rises at ﬁrst, but if the initial condition
is good, it is eradicated eventually, while it continues to rise if the condition is bad.8
The dynamics of sectoral choices and the degree of labor market segregation too could
be aﬀected greatly by initial conditions. The explanation is based on an economy that is
similar to the previous one except that the unskilled minority are more productive in the
secondary sector and thus choose the sector while the reputation is unimportant (analyzed
in Section 5.1.2). As the majority increasingly become skilled and thus prejudice toward
the minority intensiﬁes, more and more of the unskilled minority choose the primary sector
ineﬃciently, deteriorating their reputation. If the initial condition of the minority is good,
however, the reputation remains high enough that the shift to the primary sector continues,
and the labor market becomes ethnically integrated eventually (and the dynamics become
similar to the previous economy). By contrast, if the initial condition is bad, the downward
mobility of the skilled minority starts at some point, which worsens the reputation as well
as deepens the prejudice further. Hence, the unskilled minority increasingly choose the
secondary sector. Eventually, all the minority are unskilled and in the secondary sector,
thus the labor market is segregated completely by ethnicity. The ineﬃcient sectoral choices
make the dynamics sensitive to the initial condition.
Fourth, when multiple equilibria exist regarding skill investment or sectoral choices of
skilled workers, which is the case when prejudice is severe or the productivity of human
capital investment is low, given initial conditions, the initial selection of equilibrium could
8When the groups are similar in size, the dynamics of the majority too could be aﬀected greatly by
initial conditions (Section 5.1.3). If both groups start with bad conditions, both could end up without
skilled workers: a bad impression each group has about the other group aﬀects the skilled wage negatively,
which causes the downward mobility of skilled workers and the impression deteriorates further.
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aﬀect the dynamics greatly.9 When multiple equilibrium choices exist for the minority, it
is possible that, if the non-poor minority happen to (not to) invest [or choose the primary
sector] initially, the number of the skilled minority grows (falls) over time and the group are
totally skilled (unskilled) eventually (Sections 5.2.1 and 6.2). When multiple equilibria exist
for both groups, the long-run outcome of the majority too is sensitive to the initial selection
(Section 5.2.2). The majority staring with a much better condition than the minority could
end up with the smaller fraction of skilled workers, if they (the minority) happen not to (to)
invest [choose the primary sector] initially. The result suggests that, if the initial selection
is aﬀected by institutionalized discrimination limiting one group’s access to skill investment
or skilled jobs in the primary sector, the discrimination could have a lasting impact on their
well-beings well after its abolishment. Income or wealth redistribution does little to change
the situation, while aﬃrmative action treating them favorably in investment or primary-
sector employment, such as subsidies to tuition or wage, can be very eﬀective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents and analyzes the model’s static part. Section 4 presents the full-ﬂedged model and
Section 5 analyzes the dynamics. Section 6 examines a general case by lifting one assumption
that excludes situations of severe prejudice and low relative eﬃcacy of skill investment in the
primary sector. Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains proofs of lemmas and propositions.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination that examines
the situation where employers cannot observe workers’ skills and thus use two kinds of
signals, race and a signal imperfectly correlated with individual skill, such as a test and an
on-the-job monitoring, to screen workers (see Fang and Moro, 2010, for a survey). The ﬁrst
type of models such as Coate and Loury (1993) explain skill and earnings disparities among
groups with equal endowment based on multiple equilibria. Employers assign individuals to
two kinds of jobs, jobs requiring skill investment for good performance and those not, based
on the signals. Since one’s return to investment increases with investments by others of
her race, multiple equilibria with diﬀerent shares of skilled workers could exist. The second
type of models, by contrast, assume that the non-race signal is nosier for the disadvantaged
group to explain the disparities. Lundberg and Startz (1983), drawing on Phelps (1972) and
Aigner and Cain (1977), develop a model where wage equals expected marginal productivity
9It is assumed that the initial coordination among individuals of a group continues for subsequent periods:
if the group’s non-poor happen to invest initially, they continue to invest subsequently. The assumption
would be reasonable since children tend to mimic parental behaviors in real society. Kim and Loury (2009)
makes a somewhat similar assumption in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination (see footnote 29).
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conditional on the signals. The return to investment is lower for the disadvantaged group
due to the noisier signal and thus they invest less even if groups’ endowment is identical.
Recent major progress in the literature are twofold. One is the extension to a dynamic
setting. This is particularly important to the ﬁrst type of models, where employers’ self-
conﬁrming beliefs about groups’ skill levels select an equilibrium, because a static model does
not explain how such beliefs are formed. Kim and Loury (2009) develop a continuous-time
OLG model in which employers’ beliefs are formed based on objective information on groups’
present and future skill levels (reputations) and are updated with changing investments.
If the initial reputation of a group is high (low), the group converges to the high (low)
reputation steady state, while if it is intermediate, the group could converge to either steady
state, i.e. self-conﬁrming expectations determine the ﬁnal state as in static models.
The other is the consideration of inter-group interactions. In the above models, diﬀerent
groups do not interact and thus behaviors and welfare of one group do not aﬀect those of
other groups.10 Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) present a static model of the ﬁrst type in which
the investment cost depends on both individual ability and the fraction of skilled peers, which
equals a weighted average of the fractions in one’s own group and in the overall population
and the exogenous weight on own group is interpreted as the degree of segregation. In
a special case, they show that, in an economy where inter-group inequality exists under
complete segregation, complete integration eliminates inequality and raises (lowers) shares
of skilled workers of both groups, if the fraction of the initially disadvantaged group is
low (high). Lundberg and Startz (2007) construct a random search model with a second-
type element where searchers observe imperfect signals of potential partners’ abilities. In a
one-sided search model where homogenous white searchers observe more accurate signals of
whites than of blacks, there could exist an equilibrium where they trade only with whites
with good signal, even if both groups have identical ability distribution. In a two-sided
search model where searchers are heterogenous in ability and race (and signals observed by
black searchers reveal abilities of both races equally), they numerically show that there could
exist an equilibrium of racially segregated transactions where high ability whites (blacks)
accept only whites (blacks) with good signal.
This paper shares with the second type of models such as Lundberg and Startz (1983) the
feature that the importance of own group’s average human capital (reputation) in wage is
10Hence, the models cannot provide economic rationales for institutionalized discrimination used to be
enforced by dominant groups in many countries. Moro and Norman (2004) construct a static general
equilibrium model of the Coate and Loury type, in which productivities of two types of jobs are interrelated.
When the two jobs are complementary, an increased share of skilled workers has a negative (positive) eﬀect
on the wage of good (bad) jobs, and thus the return to investment of a dominant group is negatively aﬀected
by investment of the disadvantaged group, giving dominant groups an incentive for the discrimination.
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diﬀerent among groups (footnote 18). The existing works assume that the importance is ex-
ogenously greater for a disadvantaged group, while, in this paper, it decreases with the share
of own group in primary-sector skilled workers. Unlike these works, the model is dynamic
and inter-group disparities could change over time, thus making the reputation’s importance
endogenous would be crucial. Such formulation yields a diﬀerent kind of inter-group inter-
actions from works such as Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) and Lundberg and Startz (2007).
Further, the paper models sectoral choice between the primary sector and the secondary
sector, where reputation could aﬀect wage only in the former, and the credit constraint in
skill investment, both of which are not considered in other works but are important real-
economy elements, as stated in the introduction. The credit constraint generates upward
and downward mobilities of lineages through intergenerational transmission of wealth and
thus the interesting group dynamics described in the introduction, whereas modeling the
sectoral choice allows the paper to examine the dynamics of labor market segregation.
Regarding several elements, the paper employs a simpler setting than other works: there
is no non-race signal, which implicitly supposes that one’s contribution to production cannot
be observed initially but is fully revealed later; the investment cost is homogeneous; and
the generational structure is simpler than the dynamic model of Kim and Loury (2009).
However, because of the simpler setting, it can consider the above-mentioned additional
elements and examine how transitional dynamics as well as steady states depend on the
initial condition using simple phase diagrams. Further, it can identify conditions under
which multiple equilibria exist, the dynamics are diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy,
inter-group disparities are eradicated in the long run, etc.
The paper is also related to works that examine the dynamics of inter-group inequality
based on models without statistical discrimination.11 Lundberg and Startz (1998), based
on Loury (1977) and the ’ethnic capital’ model of Borjas (1992), examine a dynamic two-
group economy in which human capital is the engine of growth and there exist spillovers
from coworkers in production and from elder neighbors and, for the minority, from elders
of the majority in skill development. Individuals are exogenously segregated by ethnicity
both in the workplace and in residence. There are no spillovers from the minority to the
majority and inter-group inequality disappears in the long run. Using a version of the model
with heterogeneous innate ability and without the third spillover, they examine the eﬀect
11Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2010), building on Loury (1977), construct a discrete-time OLG model with
two groups, where the cost of skill investment is modeled as in Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008). They prove
that, when the degree of exogeneous segregation is suﬃciently high, the long-run group equality cannnot
be attained even with very small initial inequality. In a special case, they show a dynamic version of the
result of Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) mentioned earlier. Yuki (2009) examines the dynamics of disparities
between educated and uneducated workers in a one-group and one-sector economy where innate ability is
heterogeneous and wage is determined as in this paper (education is the signal).
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of workplace desegregation, i.e. allowing the minority to move to majority-dominated jobs
by paying a mobility cost, on the dynamics. They examine the eﬀect of one-time workplace
desegregation, while this paper examines the dynamics of labor market segregation in an
economy where workers can freely choose sectors.
The modeling of skill investment and intergenerational transmission of wealth draws
on Galor and Zeira (1993) and Yuki (2008), in which, as in this paper, skill investment is
constrained by intergenerational transfers motivated by impure altruism.
3 Static Model
This section presents and analyzes the static part of the model. The dynamic part is
presented in the next section. Consider a small open economy (interest rate r is exogenous)
populated by a continuum of individuals who belong to one of two ethnic (racial, religious)
groups and are homogeneous in innate ability. Results in this section can be applied to traits
that are not intergenerationally transmitted, such as gender and home province, as well.
Individuals decide whether or not to invest in skill. The cost of skill investment ch must be
self-ﬁnanced, so they must have enough wealth. Examples of the investment include spending
on study materials or private tutoring, going to a high-quality private school instead of a
low-quality public school, and spending time on home study, not on helping parents’ work.
There exist up to two production sectors, the primary sector with advanced technology
and the secondary sector with backward technology. The primary and the secondary sec-
tors correspond to formal/modern and informal/traditional sectors in developing economies,
while in advanced economies, typical secondary-sector jobs would be neighborhood jobs of
small businesses. Skilled and unskilled workers are perfectly substitutable in both sectors.
In real economy, labor and product markets of the primary sector tend to be ethnically more
mixed than the secondary sector probably because of diﬀerences in needed skills, scales of
operations, and enforcement of law (Aslund and Skans, 2010).12
Two assumptions are made based on the fact. First, skill investment raises human
capital from hu (u is for unskilled) to hs (s is for skilled) in the secondary sector, while, in
the primary sector, it raises human capital of ethnic (racial, religious) group i from Auihu
to Asihs, where the relative human capital Aki (k=u; s) depends on the share of one’s own
12Primary-sector ﬁrms need workers with highly specialized skills and scales of operations tend to be large.
Thus, to assign jobs to workers with appropriate skills eﬃciently, labor markets tend to be anonymous and
ethnically integrated. Further, the sector tends to be regulated by laws prohibiting overt employment
discrimination. By contrast, in the secondary sector with the contrasting features, employment is largely
through personal connections and thus labor markets are more segregated. Also, products of the primary
sector are supplied to national markets, while those of the secondary sector, especially services, are mainly
for local markets of particular groups. For the Swedish economy, Aslund and Skans (2010) ﬁnd that the
tendency for a minority worker to work with people of his/her group is stronger in smaller establishments.
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group in the total population (Ni is the population of group i):
Aki=Ak
¡
Ni
Ni+Nj
¢
; j 6= i; A0k(¢)>0: (1)
That is, given skill, human capital in the primary sector is lower for the smaller group.13 The
formulation captures the fact that, in the integrated primary sector, minorities are prone to
face disadvantages in production or suﬀer greater disutility of work (human capital may be
measured net of the disutility), because prevalent language, customs, taste, code of conduct,
and culture are diﬀerent from theirs.14 Further, if they are discriminated non-statistically
and are not assigned relevant tasks, they end up in lower productivity.15 Note that Aki<1
is possible if the quality of formal institutions and thus the sector’s productivity are low
(as shown in footnote 20 below, Aki increases with the sector’s relative productivity), if the
discrimination exists, or if the disutility of work is greater in the sector.
As is made clear later, the above assumption is imposed for analytical simplicity as well
as for reality, and main implications of the model remain intact without it. By contrast,
the next assumption is crucial to results. In the primary sector, due to complex production
processes and organizational structures, evaluating each worker’s contribution to output
tends to be diﬃcult. Accurate evaluations are particularly diﬃcult at least initially, if a
worker and her evaluators belong to diﬀerent groups due to the above-mentioned inter-
group diﬀerences (Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard, 2011).16 Similarly, qualiﬁcations of a job
applicant tend to be assessed less precisely when interviewers are from other groups (Stoll,
Raphael, and Holzer, 2004).17 Hence, the wage is assumed to depend partly on her human
capital and partly on its signal, the average human capital (the average wage) of her group in
the sector, and the signal’s importance decreases with the share of her group in the sector’s
skilled workers.18 Like other models of statistical discrimination, it is implicitly supposed
13Skill and human capital are diﬀerent : skill is ability and its level is either skilled or unskilled, while
human capital is the contribution of skill to output (may be net of the cost of public schools) and workers
of a given skill level can have diﬀerent levels of human capital depending on sectoral choices and ethnicity.
14When the majority were historically in disadvantaged positions, dominant language, customs, or culture
relevant to the primary sector could be diﬀerent from theirs. In this case, all results remain intact if the
argument of Ak(¢) is replaced by the group’s historical (initial) relative position.
15Non-statistical discrimination seems to aﬀect labor market outcomes even in advanced nations. For the
U.S., Charles and Guryan (2008) ﬁnd that white-black wage gaps in a state are related to the degree of bias
by whites in the left tail of the bias distribution in the state, consistent with the model of Becker (1971).
16Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2011) ﬁnd, for a large U.S. retail ﬁrm, that employees generally have
better outcomes, particularly in dismissals and promotions, when they are the same race as their supervisor.
17Stoll, Raphael, and Holzer (2004) ﬁnd, for the U.S. economy, that establishments where blacks are in
charge of hiring are signiﬁcantly more likely to employ blacks than those with white hiring agents, and this
pattern can be explained largely by the higher application rate of blacks and the higher hiring rate of black
job applicants in establishments with black hiring agents.
18As mentioned in Section 2, classic works by Aigner and Cain (1977) and Lundberg and Startz (1983)
are based on a similar idea. Unlike this model, workers’ contributions to output are never revealed and thus
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that education level is not a good signal, implying that the model is concerned with an
economy where the quality of public schools is not adequate or varies greatly across schools
and thus many people expend on supplementary study materials and tutoring or attend
private schools, which, as mentioned in the introduction, is the case in many countries.
The wage of an individual with skill level k (k=u; s) of group i is given by:
(1¡si)Akihk+siE[Aihi]; (2)
where si2 [0;1] measures the importance of the average human capital, E[Aihi], and decreases
with the share:19
si=s
µ
psiHiNi
psiHiNi+psjHjNj
¶
; s0(¢)<0; s(1)=0: (3)
Hi is the fraction of skilled workers in group i, and psi is the probability that a skilled worker
of group i chooses the primary sector. The size of si reﬂects the degree of the incomplete
information and is named the degree of prejudice toward the group. If the sector’s skilled
workers are all from her group, s(1) = 0 for simplicity. The average human capital, also
called the group’s reputation, equals (pui is the probability for an unskilled worker):
E[Akihk]=
psiHiAsihs+pui(1¡Hi)Auihu
psiHi+pui(1¡Hi) : (4)
In the secondary sector, each worker’s contribution is easy to measure or workers in the
workplace belong to the same group, thus wage equals human capital, hk (k=u; s).
These wage equations can be derived from proﬁt maximization problems of ﬁrms that
hire workers and physical capital for production.20 Further, productivity growth can be
incorporated without aﬀecting results qualitatively, as long as the cost of skill investment
ch is assumed to grow proportionately.
The following assumptions are imposed on Aki (k=u; s) and the function s(¢).
Assumption 1 (i) Asi¸Aui (ii) s(0)· (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , Asi¸ huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs .
The ﬁrst assumption states that skilled workers have comparative advantages (weakly) in the
primary sector, which would be justiﬁed from the fact that the sector adopts more advanced
technology and thus workers’ skills are more important. It also implies that skill investment
a worker’s wage equals a weighted average of her group’s average human capital and her non-race signal.
Further, the importance of the race signal is exogenously greater for the disadvantaged group.
19An interpretation of si is that those who assess her performance cannot recognize her skill during the
ﬁrst si fraction of time (and they can identify it after that). Alternatively, (1¡si)Akihk may be construed
as the amount of her contribution to output recognized precisely by them.
20Suppose that ﬁrms with identical CRS technology hire workers and physical capital to produce a ﬁnal
good in each sector. Then, by normalizing the wage rate per unit of human capital (which depends on total
factor productivity and the interest rate) of the informal sector to 1, the same wage equations are obtained.
The relative human capital in the formal sector Aki (k=u; s) increases with the sector’s relative TFP.
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is (weakly) more productive in the primary sector. The second assumption states that
the (private) net return to choosing the primary sector is weakly higher for skilled workers
than for unskilled workers even when the degree of prejudice is severest, i.e. si= s(0) (the
assumption can be expressed as [(1¡s(0))Asi¡1]hs¸ [(1¡s(0))Aui¡1]hu). The ﬁrst assumption
is maintained throughout the paper, while the second one is relaxed in Section 6.
3.1 Sectoral choices and skill investment
Since workers are freely mobile between the sectors, they choose the one(s) with higher
earnings. The next lemma presents equilibrium values of psi and pui for given psj (j 6= i),
when Hi> 0 and psjHj > 0, in which case si> 0 holds from (3).
21 Only equilibria that are
stable with respect to small perturbations to equilibrium psi and pui are considered.
22
Lemma 1 (Sectoral choices) Suppose Hi>0 and psjHj>0 for j 6= i.
(i)When Asi¸Aui¸1, psi=pui=1.
(ii)When Asi> 1>Aui, psi=1. pui=0 for si· (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , pui=
siAsihs+(1¡si)Auihu¡hu
(1¡Aui)hu
Hi
1¡Hi 2
(0;1) for si2
¡
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
1
Hi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¢
, and pui=1 for si¸ 1Hi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu :
(iii)When Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, psi=pui=0.
When Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, that is, when both types of workers weakly prefer the primary
sector under si = 0, they do choose the sector. Intuitively, the reason is that, with si > 0
and psi>0, unskilled workers beneﬁt from the presence of skilled workers in the sector and
thus strictly prefer the sector, and the net return from choosing the sector is higher for
skilled workers from Assumption 1 (ii). When Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi< 1, that is, when
unskilled workers strictly and skilled workers at least weakly prefer the secondary sector
under si=0, they choose the sector. This is because, the net return to the primary sector
for the skilled is lower under si>0 due to the negative eﬀect of the unskilled on their wage.
When Asi > 1 > Aui, skilled workers select the primary sector, while choices of unskilled
workers depend on si: since the positive eﬀect from the skilled increases with si, they select
the primary (secondary) sector when si is large (small), and when si is intermediate, they
are indiﬀerent between the sectors and pui2(0;1) is increasing in si.
Taking into account the dependence of wages on sectoral choices, an individual decides
on skill investment. As detailed in the next section, she can spend wealth on assets too.
Thus, she invests in skill only if it is ﬁnancially accessible and proﬁtable. Let Fi be the
21Clearly, when Hi>0 and psjHj=0 for j 6= i (thus si=0), pki=1(= 0) if Aki> (<)1 and any pki2 [0;1]
if Aki=1 (k=u; s), while when Hi=0, the same result holds for k=u.
22An equilibrium is deﬁned to be stable regarding the small perturbations if there exists a neighborhood
of equilibrium psi and pui such that, from any psi and pui in the neighborhood, they have tendencies to
return to equilibrium values in a simple dynamics in which pki(k = s; u) increases (decreases) when the net
return to choosing the formal sector for type k workers is positive (negative).
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proportion of individuals who can aﬀord the investment in group i. Hi cannot exceed Fi
but does not necessarily equal Fi. Let phi be the probability that an individual with enough
wealth does invest. To simplify the analysis, the following assumption is imposed on phi.
Assumption 2When individuals are indiﬀerent among multiple values of phi, the highest
value holds in equilibrium.
For example, when psi=pui=0 and hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu=0, phi=1 holds. The next lemma
presents equilibrium Hi=phiFi for given Hj and psj (j 6= i) when Fi>0. Only equilibria that
are stable with respect to a small perturbation to equilibrium phi are considered.
Lemma 2 (Skill investment) Suppose Fi>0.
(i)When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi.
(ii)When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu,
(a) If Asihs¡ (1+r)ch ¸ hu (thus Asi > 1) and Aui ¸ 1, when psjHj = 0 for j 6= i, Hi =
Fi (= 0) if Asihs¡(1+r)ch ¸ (<)Auihu. When for psjHj > 0 (thus si > 0), Hi = Fi if
s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, both Hi = Fi and Hi = 0 are equilibria (Hi = 0 is
the equilibrium) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu .
(b) If Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and Aui<1, Hi=Fi when psjHj=0 for j 6= i. When psjHj>0, if
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi (no stable equilibria exist).
(c) Otherwise, Hi=0.
When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, i.e. the investment is socially productive (and privately proﬁtable)
in the secondary sector, every individual with enough wealth invests in skill, because, when
choosing the primary sector is more proﬁtable, the (net) private return to the investment is
weakly higher than hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu from Assumption 1 (i) (when psjHj =0 for j 6= i) and
(ii) (when psjHj>0). When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu and Asihs¡(1+r)ch<hu [(ii)(c) of the lemma],
nobody invests because the maximum net return under si=0, max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu,
is negative and thus the net return under si > 0 too is negative. (Note that the skilled
[unskilled] wage under si>0 is lower [higher] than under si=0.)
By contrast, when hs¡(1+r)ch<hu and Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hu (thus Asi>1), the decision
depends on Aui, si, and s(0). When Aui¸1 and psjHj>0 for j 6= i, since all workers choose
the primary sector from Lemma 1 (i), the net return equals (1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch
and decreases with si. Hence, if the value of si at Hi=Fi is small enough that the net return
is positive at Hi = Fi, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi = Fi is an equilibrium,
while if s(0) > Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu and thus the return is negative at Hi = 0, Hi = 0 is an
equilibrium. Since s(0) > s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
, both Hi = Fi and Hi = 0 are equilibria when
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu <s(0) due to strategic complementarity : as more people
invest and become skilled workers, the degree of prejudice si falls and primary-sector wages
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reﬂect human capital more closely, raising the return. The result when Aui<1 and psjHj>0
can be explained similarly. In this case, however, Hi=0 is not an equilibrium (since, given
Hi=0, no unskilled workers choose the primary sector and thus the investment is proﬁtable
from Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hs), thus no stable equilibria exist if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu ,
i.e. si is too high for the return to be positive at Hi=Fi.
By combining Lemmas 1 and 2, skill investment and sectoral choices of group i given
choices by the other group are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Group i’s investment and sectoral choices given choices by group j )
(i)When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi and, if psjHj>0 for j 6= i, si=s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
.
(a)When psjHj > 0 and Asi ¸Aui ¸ 1 or Asi > 1>Aui, psi = 1. If Asi ¸Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1;
and if Asi>1>Aui, pui=0 for si· (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , pui=
siAsihs+(1¡si)Auihu¡hu
(1¡Aui)hu
Fi
1¡Fi 2(0;1) for
si2
¡
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
1
Fi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¢
, and pui=1 for si¸ 1Fi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu .
(b)When psjHj>0 and Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, psi=pui=0.
(c)When psjHj=0, pki=1(= 0) if Aki>(<)1 and any pki2 [0;1] if Aki=1 (k=u; s).
(ii)When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu,
(a)If Asihs¡ (1+ r)ch ¸ hu and Aui ¸ 1, when psjHj = 0, Hi = Fi (= 0) if Asihs ¡ (1+
r)ch¸ (<)Auihu. When psjHj > 0, Hi=Fi if s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , otherwise, both
Hi= Fi and Hi= 0 are equilibria (Hi = 0 is the equilibrium) when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu .
(b) If Asihs¡ (1+ r)ch ¸ hu and Aui < 1, Hi = Fi when psjHj = 0. When psjHj > 0, if
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<(¸)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi (no stable equilibria exist).
(c) If Asihs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Hi=0.
(d)When Hi = Fi, if psjHj > (=)0, psi and pui are determined as in (i)(a) [(i)(c)], while
when Hi=0, pui=1(= 0) if Aui>(<)1 and any pui2 [0;1] if Aui=1.
Based on Proposition 1 (i), Figure 1 illustrates sectoral choices when hs¡(1+r)ch¸ hu
(thus Hi=Fi) and psjHj > 0 for j 6= i, i.e. si> 0, on the (Aui; Asi) plane. Aui and Asi must
satisfy Assumption 1 (i) and (ii), thus only the upper left region of the two bold solid lines
is feasible. As for skilled workers, psi = 1 when Asi > 1 and psi = 0 when Asi · 1. Choices
of unskilled workers, by contrast, are determined by the two bold broken lines, and pui=0
(= 1) in the region at the left (right) side of the left (right) broken line and pui 2 (0;1) in
the region between the two lines. (When pui2(0;1), pui increases with Aui and Asi.) pui>0
is possible with Aui < 1 because of the positive eﬀect from skilled workers in the primary
sector. Positions of the bold lines and the value of pui depend on Fi through si:
Figure 2 illustrates skill investment and sectoral choices when hs¡ (1+ r)ch < hu and
psjHj > 0, based on Proposition 1 (ii). When Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1 and psi = 1 (when Hi > 0)
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Figure 1: Sectoral choices when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and psjHj>0 for j 6= i
always hold. As for skill investment, Hi=Fi (Hi=0) is the only equilibrium in the region
on or above Asi=
hu
hs
Aui +
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs (on or below Asi=
hu
hs
Aui +
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs ), while both Hi=Fi
and Hi=0 are equilibria between the two lines, the area with slanting lines. When Aui<1,
Hi=0 holds in the region below Asi=
hu+(1+r)ch
hs
, while in the region on or above the line,
Hi=Fi holds above Asi=
hu
hs
Aui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs and no equilibria exist on or below it (the area with
vertical lines). Sectoral choices when Aui < 1 and Hi = Fi are as in Figure 1, thus psi = 1
always (Hi=Fi only when Asi¸ hu+(1+r)chhs >1). Positions of Asi= huhsAui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡si)hs and of the
two broken lines and thus their choices depend on Fi through si:
Sectoral choices and skill investment may not be socially optimal when si > 0. When
Aui<1, because of the positive eﬀect from skilled workers, some or all of unskilled workers
choose the less productive primary sector at the right side of the left broken line of Figures 1
and 2. As for skill investment, if workers are optimally allocated to sectors, the investment
is socially productive on or above the dotted line below the area with slanting lines when
Aui¸ 1 (where Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu is satisﬁed), and on or above Asi= hu+(1+r)chhs when
Aui<1 in Figure 2. However, when Aui¸1, an individual may not carry out the productive
investment in the region between Asi =
hu
hs
Aui+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs and the dotted line due to the
negative eﬀect of unskilled workers on the return to investment.
Skill investment and sectoral choices in a general equilibrium are determined by applying
the proposition to the two groups simultaneously. Cases in which the investment is always
proﬁtable for both groups can be easily identiﬁed from the proposition (see Figure 2 too).
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Figure 2: Skill investment and sectoral choices when hs¡(1+ r)ch<hu and psjHj>0
Corollary 1 (Cases in which the investment is always proﬁtable for both groups)
Hi=Fi holds for any i and Fi; when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu or when hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hu
(thus Asi > 1), and (1¡ s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu] ¸ (1+ r)ch. For group i with Asi ¸ 1, si =
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
, where psj=1(=0) when Asj ¸(<)1, and for one with Asi<1, si=s(0).
In other cases, the determination of Hi is not simple, which is examined in Proposition 2 of
Section 5 with an additional assumption.
3.2 Wages
Wage levels depend on skill investment and sectoral choices. Denote the unskilled wage of
group i by wui and the skilled wage net of the investment cost by wsi. Then, the wages
when Hi=Fi and psjHj>0 for j 6= i, i.e. si>0, are:
if psi=pui=1; wui = (1¡si)Auihu+si[FiAsihs+(1¡Fi)Auihu]
= Auihu+siFi(Asihs¡Auihu); (5)
wsi = (1¡si)Asihs+si[FiAsihs+(1¡Fi)Auihu]¡(1+r)ch
= Asihs¡si(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch; (6)
if psi=1 and pui2(0;1); wui = (1¡si)Auihu+si FiAsihs+pui(1¡Fi)AuihuFi+pui(1¡Fi) = hu; (7)
wsi = (1¡si)Asihs +si FiAsihs+pui(1¡Fi)AuihuFi+pui(1¡Fi) ¡(1+r)ch
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= hu+(1¡si)(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch; (8)
and if psi = 1(= 0) and pui = 0, wui = hu and wsi =Asihs¡(1+r)ch(= hs¡(1+r)ch). When
Hi=0 or when si=0, wui=maxfAuihu; hug and wsi=maxfAsihs; hsg¡(1+r)ch (if Hi>0).
4 Dynamic model
Based on the results in the previous section, this section presents the dynamic part of the
model. Consider an OLG economy composed of a continuum of two-period-lived individuals.
The distribution of wealth over the initial generation of each group is given, while wealth
distributions of subsequent generations are determined endogenously.
4.1 Lifetime of an individual
Childhood : In childhood, an individual receives a transfer from her parent (if she belongs
to the initial generation, it is given) and spends it on two options, assets (yields interest
rate r) and skill investment (costs ch), to maximize future income. Consider an individual
born into a lineage of group i in period t¡1 (generation t) who receives bit units of transfer
and allocates it between asset ait and skill investment vit. As shown in the previous section,
when an equilibrium exists, Hit=Fit or Hit=0 (i.e. phit=1 or phit=0), depending on Fit
and exogenous variables such as Asi and Aui (and, through sit, corresponding variables of
other groups). When Hit=Fit, the allocation is determined by bit:
ait=bit; vit=0; if bit<ch; (9)
ait=bit¡ch; vit=ch; if bit¸ch: (10)
By contrast, when Hit=0, ait=bit and vit=0.
Adulthood : In adulthood, she chooses a sector based on the skill investment, obtains
income from assets and work, and spends it on consumption cit and a transfer to her single
child bit+1. Her utility maximization problem is:
maxuit = (cit)
1¡°b(bit+1)°b ; s:t: cit+bit+1 = wit+(1+r)ait; (11)
where °b 2 (0;1) and wit is her gross wage, which depends on her human capital, Fit, and
exogenous variables (and corresponding variables of other groups). By solving the maxi-
mization problem, her consumption and transfer rules equal
cit = (1¡°b)fwit+(1+r)aitg; (12)
bit+1 = °bfwit+(1+r)aitg: (13)
16
Generational change: At the beginning of period t+1, current adults pass away, current
children become adults, and new children are born into the economy. Since each adult has
one child, the total (adult) population of the group is time-invariant and equals Ni.
4.2 Dynamics of individual transfers
The dynamic equation linking the received transfer bit to the transfer given to the next
generation bit+1 is derived from the transfer rule (13). For a current unskilled worker, it is
obtained by substituting wit=wuit and ait=bit into (13):
bit+1 = °bfwuit+(1+r)bitg: (14)
The assumption °b(1+r)< 1 is made so that the ﬁxed point of the equation for given wuit,
b¤(wuit)´ °b1¡°b(1+r)wuit, exists. The ﬁxed point becomes crucial in later analyses.
For a current skilled worker, who exists only when Hit=Fit, the dynamic equation is
bit+1 = °bfwsit+(1+r)bitg; (15)
which is obtained by substituting wit=wsit+(1+r)ch and ait=bit¡ch into (13).
The equations show that the dynamics of transfers within a lineage depend on those of
wages and Hit, which in turn are determined by the time evolution of Fit and Fjt (j 6= i).
4.3 Aggregate dynamics
The time evolution of Fit (the fraction of group i individuals who can aﬀord skill investment)
is determined by the dynamics of individual transfers. That is, the individual and aggregate
dynamics are interrelated.
More speciﬁcally, when Hit=Fit, if oﬀspring of some unskilled workers become accessible
to the investment through wealth accumulation, Fit+1>Fit, while, if some of present skilled
workers cannot leave enough transfers to cover the investment cost, Fit+1<Fit.
The former takes places iﬀ there exist lineages satisfying bit < ch and bit+1 ¸ ch. From
(14), the following condition must hold for such lineages to exist:
b¤(wuit) ´ °b1¡°b(1+r)wuit > ch: (16)
By contrast, the latter occurs iﬀ lineages satisfying bit¸ ch and bit+1<ch exist. From (15),
the necessary condition is
b¤(wsit) ´ °b1¡°b(1+r)wsit < ch: (17)
Since b¤(wsit)¸ b¤(wuit), the above equations do not hold simultaneously. If (16) holds,
Fit+1 ¸ Fit, while if (17) is true, Fit+1 · Fit: Fit+1 = Fit is possible depending on the
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distribution of transfers over the group, but, if the condition continues to hold, Fit does
change at some point. When neither equations are satisﬁed, Fit+1 = Fit. The dynamics
when Hit=0 depend on the relative value of b
¤
(wuit) to ch only.
Regarding the value of b¤(wuit), the following is assumed.
Assumption 3 hu· 1¡°b(1+r)°b ch
This implies that b¤(wuit)·ch when pui;t<1, that is, oﬀspring of unskilled workers can never
aﬀord the investment if the unskilled wage stays at the lowest level, hu. The assumption is
imposed to rule out the trivial case in which hu>
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch and thus Fit always increases.
Since the dynamics of individual transfers depend on the evolution of Fjt (j 6= i) through
skill investment and wages, the dynamics of Fit and Fjt are interrelated. The next section
analyzes the joint dynamics of the variables and those of related variables of interest.
5 Analyses
This section analyzes the time evolution of Fit, skill composition, sectoral choices, wages,
and intergroup inequality by relying on phase diagrams. Depending on values of exogenous
variables such as Asi and Aui, many qualitatively diﬀerent dynamics arise, hence analyses
are restricted to cases that are representative and yield clear-cut results.
For simplicity, the elasticity of si with respect to Fi (in absolute value) is assumed to be
less than 1 in dynamic analyses, although all of main results hold without the assumption.
Assumption 4 s(x)+s0(x)x(1¡x) > 0 for any x2 [0; 1), @(siFi)
@Fi
> 0 always.
5.1 When skill investment is always proﬁtable
First, consider the case in which Hi = Fi always holds for any group i. From Corollary 1,
this is true when hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu, or when hs¡(1+r)ch < hu, Asihs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu (thus
Asi>1), and (1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]¸ (1+r)ch for any i (see Figure 2). That is, it must be
that skill investment is socially productive and individually proﬁtable, as long as workers
are optimally assigned to sectors.
5.1.1 A majority and a large minority
Consider an economy where the majority (group 1 ) and the minority (group 2 ), i.e. N1>N2,
exist. Suppose that the relative size of the minority, N2
N1
, or the relative productivity of the
primary sector (footnote 20) is high enough that Aki> 1 (k=u; s; i=1; 2), i.e. all workers
are more productive in the sector. Then, psi= pui=1 from Proposition 1 (i)(a), (i)(c), and
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Figure 3: Dynamics when Hit=Fit always and the relative size of the minority is large
(ii)(d), i.e. all workers choose the sector. Skill investment of those with enough wealth and
sectoral choices are socially optimal from Aki>1 and the conditions of Corollary 1.
As for the dynamics of F1t, assume Au1hu >
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch, that is, even with the lowest
wage, descendants of the unskilled majority can aﬀord the investment eventually. Then,
F1t increases over time and H
¤
1 =F
¤
1 =1 in the long run (superscript ¤ indicates the steady
state value). In contrast, Au2 and As2 are lower and the following is assumed: Au2hu <
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch, i.e. with the lowest wage, descendants of the unskilled minority remain unskilled;£
1¡s¡ N2
N1+N2
¢¤
Au2hu+s
¡
N2
N1+N2
¢
As2hs >
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch, i.e. with the highest wage (at (F1;F2) =
(1;1) from Assumption 4), they can aﬀord the investment eventually; As2hs >
ch
°b
and (1¡
s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu<
ch
°b
, i.e. with the highest (lowest) wage, descendants of the skilled
minority can (cannot) stay skilled. Then, b¤(wu2)=ch and b¤(ws2)=ch exist and equal:
Au2hu+s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
F2(As2hs¡Au2hu)= 1¡°b(1+r)°b ch; (18)
As2hs¡s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
(1¡F2)(As2hs¡Au2hu)= ch°b ; (19)
which are obtained by plugging (5) and (6) with s2=s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
into (16) (with > replaced
by =) and (17) (with < replaced by =), respectively.23
The dynamics of F1t and F2t can be analyzed graphically by placing b
¤(wu2) = ch and
b¤(ws2)=ch on the (F1;F2) plane (Figure 3).24 As F1 rises, F2 satisfying b¤(wu2)=ch (b¤(ws2)=
23Because wu2 for given F2F1 increases linearly with F2 and b
¤(wu2)> (<)ch at (F1;F2) = (1;1) (as F2! 0
on F2F1 =1) from the two assumptions on the wage (see eq. 18), there exists F2 2 (0;1) on F2F1 =1 satisfying
b¤(wu2)= ch. b¤(ws2)= ch exists for any F12 (0;1] (at F1=0, b¤(ws2)>ch always) since, for any such F1, ws2
increases with F2 and b¤(ws2)< (>)ch at F2=0 (=1) from the two assumptions on the wage (see eq. 19).
24b¤(wu2)= ch intersects with F1=1 at F22 (0;1) and with F2=1 at F12 (0;1) from the two assumptions
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ch) falls (rises) from (18) and (19), since s2 increases (decreases) with F1 (F2) and s2F2
increases with F2. The direction of motion of F2t (F1t) is represented by vertical (horizontal)
arrows. Since ws2 decreases and wu2 increases with F1; in the region at the right (left) side of
b¤(ws2)=ch, b¤(ws2)< (>)ch and F2t decreases (non-decreases) over time, while in the region
at the right (left) side of b¤(wu2)=ch, b¤(wu2)> (<)ch and F2t increases (non-increases).
Unlike the economy in which reputation does not aﬀect wages, i.e. sit=0 always, where
F1t increases and F2t is constant over time, the long-run fate of the minority could be very
diﬀerent depending on the level of F2 in the initial period, F20. When the initial distribution
of wealth is such that a suﬃciently large portion of them can aﬀord the investment, to be
more accurate, when b¤(wu2)> ch at (F1;F2) = (1;F20), H¤2 = F
¤
2 = 1 as well as H
¤
1 = F
¤
1 = 1
in the long run. As an illustration, suppose that F10 is not so high that b
¤(wu20)<ch holds.
Then, as H1t =F1t increases over time, the inﬂuence of the majority in wage determination
becomes stronger and wages of the minority are aﬀected more by their reputation as a group,
i.e. s2t increases. As a result, the unskilled (skilled) wage of the minority rises (falls) over
time. Since H2t =F20 is not low and thus their reputation (average human capital) is not
bad, the wage of the skilled minority stays high enough for their descendants to remain
skilled, while the unskilled wage grows to the point that the investment becomes aﬀordable
to some of their oﬀspring at some point, i.e. b¤(wu2t)>ch. H2t =F2t and the reputation start
to rise, and the improved reputation further stimulates the upward mobility of unskilled
workers. In the long run, everyone becomes a skilled worker.
By contrast, when F20 is small enough that b
¤(ws2)<ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), (H¤1 ;H
¤
2 )=
(1;0) in the long run. Since their initial reputation is low and its eﬀect on the wages increases
over time, the skilled wage falls to the point that oﬀspring of skilled workers become unable
to aﬀord the investment at some point. F2t start to decrease and the deteriorated reputation
spurs the downward mobility of skilled workers. In the long run, all of the majority (minority)
are skilled (unskilled). (When F20 is in the intermediate range, (H
¤
1 ;H
¤
2 )=(1;F20).)
As long as (F10;F20) is located at the left side of the two loci, the minority’s average skill
and wage levels relative to the majority fall at ﬁrst. However, if F20 is suﬃciently high, they
start to rise at some point and both groups are totally skilled in the long run, otherwise,
the relative levels continue to fall and, in particular, if F20 is low, the two groups are totally
segregated by skill levels in the long run. The initial condition aﬀects the long-run fate of
the minority through their reputation: good (bad) reputation begets good (bad) reputation.
on wu2. b¤(ws2)=ch intersects with F1=1 at F22(0;1) from the assumptions on ws2, does not intersect with
F2=0 from (1¡s (0))As2hs+s (0)Au2hu< ch°b , and not with F1=0 from As2hs> ch°b . (Thus, it approaches
(F1;F2) = (0;0).) b¤(wu2) = ch and b¤(ws2) = ch do not intersect from ws2 > wu2 for F2 > 0. In the ﬁgure,
b¤(ws2)=cs is always below the 450 line, but if
£
1¡s¡ N2N1+N2¢¤As2hs+s¡ N2N1+N2¢Au2hu< cs°b , it crosses the line.
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5.1.2 A majority and a small minority
Next consider an economy where N2
N1
or the relative productivity of the primary sector is low
enough that As2 > 1>Au2 and As1 ¸ Au1 > 1 hold, i.e. unskilled workers of the minority
are less productive (net of the disutility of work) in the sector. Then, from Proposition
1 (i)(a), (i)(c), and (ii)(d), psi = pu1 = 1 (i = 1; 2), while pu2 = 0 for s2 · (1¡Au2)huAs2hs¡Au2hu ,
pu2 =
s2As2hs+(1¡s2)Au2hu¡hu
(1¡Au2)hu
F2
1¡F2 2 (0;1) for s2 2
¡ (1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu ;
1
F2
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu
¢
, and pu2 = 1 for
s2¸ 1F2
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu . Unlike the previous economy, sectoral choices of the unskilled minority
are not socially optimal when pu2>0. The dividing line between pu2=0 and pu22(0;1) and
the one between pu22(0;1) and pu2=1 are given respectively by:
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
= (1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu ; (20)
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
F2=
(1¡Au2)hu
As2hs¡Au2hu : (21)
Assumptions related to the dynamics of F1t and F2t are same as the previous case except
that (1¡s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu < ch°b is strengthened to hu+(1¡s(0))(As2hs¡Au2hu) <
ch
°b
(and Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch now follows from Assumption 3). Thus, b
¤(wu2)=ch and b¤(ws2)=ch
when pu2=1 are given by (18) and (19), respectively. When pu22(0;1), b¤(ws2)=ch equals
hu+
£
1¡s¡ F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢¤
(As2hs¡Au2hu)= ch°b ; (22)
which is obtained by substituting (8) into (17) (with < replaced by =).25
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of F1t, F2t, and pu2t graphically. On the (F1;F2) plane,
the dividing line between pu2 = 0 and pu2 2 (0;1) is a positively-sloped straight line that
is located above the 450 line and approaches the origin (pu2 = 0 at F2 = 0). The dividing
line between pu2 2 (0;1) and pu2 = 1 is a negatively-sloped curve, because the LHS of (21)
depends positively on s2F2, like the LHS of the equation for b
¤(wu2) = ch; (18).26 The two
lines are located at the left side of b¤(wu2)=ch (from Assumption 3) and intersect at F2=1.
b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) is a positively-sloped straight line approaching the origin.27
The dynamics of F1t and F2t are as in the previous case: when F20 is large [small] enough
that b¤(wu2)>ch[b¤(ws2)<ch] at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), F2t starts to increase [decrease] eventually
and (F ¤1 ;F
¤
2 )=(H
¤
1 ;H
¤
2 )=(1;1)[=(1;0)] in the long run.
25b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) exists since the LHS of (22) is strictly higher (lower) than the RHS at lowest
(highest) s2, i.e. at s2 satisfying (20) (s2=s(0)), from As2hs> ch°b and hu+(1¡s(0))(As2hs¡Au2hu)< ch°b .
26Since s
¡
N2
N1+N2
¢
> (1¡Au2)huAs2hs¡Au2hu , i.e. pu2 > 0 on
F2
F1
= 1 and pu2 = 1 at (F1;F2) = (1;1), from
£
1¡
s
¡
N2
N1+N2
¢¤
Au2hu+s
¡
N2
N1+N2
¢
As2hs >
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch and Assumption 3, the dividing line between pu2 = 0 and
pu2 2 (0;1) is above the 450 line and the one between pu2 2 (0;1) and pu2=1 exists and intersects with the
450 line (and with F2=1).
27Unlike the ﬁgure, b¤(ws2)=ch when pu22(0;1) may be located above the 450 line or it may not intersect
with the dividing line between pu22(0;1) and pu2=1, although main results are not aﬀected.
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Figure 4: Dynamics when Hit =Fit always and the relative size of the minority is small
What is new is that sectoral choices of the unskilled minority change over time. Suppose
F10 is small enough that pu20 = 0; i.e. they choose the secondary sector initially: Then,
as long as pu2t = 0 is satisﬁed, wages of the minority equal human capital levels and are
constant. After F1t and thus s2t become high enough that pu2t 2 (0;1) holds, induced by
the growth of s2t, more and more of the unskilled minority choose the primary sector over
time despite such choice is ineﬃcient, i.e. Au2< 1. This deteriorates their reputation and,
together with the increasing importance of reputation (an increase in s2t), lowers the wage
of the skilled minority, while that of the unskilled minority remains constant at hu. That is,
average earnings of the minority fall (note Au2<1).
After that, the dynamics of pu2t and the wages diﬀer greatly depending on the initial
condition. When F20 is suﬃciently high, pu2t=1 is realized at some point and wage dynamics
become qualitatively same as the previous economy. The labor market is integrated in the
long run in the sense that all individuals work in the primary sector. By contrast, when F20
is small, the wage of the skilled minority falls to the point that b¤(ws2t)<ch and F2t starts to
decrease at some point. The fall of F2t, like the growth of F1t, raises s2t, but it also worsens
the minority’s reputation directly. While the positive eﬀect on s2t is stronger, pu2t rises
as before, but eventually the negative eﬀect dominates and pu2t starts to fall. In the long
run, all of the minority are unskilled and in the secondary sector, thus the labor market is
segregated completely by ethnicity. Ineﬃcient sectoral choices of the unskilled minority make
the outcome sensitive to the initial condition and quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free”
economy: if their choices are optimal, i.e. pu2t=0, F2t is constant as under s2t=0.
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Figure 5: Dynamics when Hit =Fit always and two groups are equal in size
5.1.3 Two equally sized groups
Finally, consider an economy composed of two equally sized groups, as an approximation of
an economy composed of the groups with similar sizes. Thus, Ak1=Ak2=Ak(
1
2
) (k= u; s)
and denote it by Ak and assume Ak > 1 for simplicity. Then, psi = pui = 1 (i= 1; 2) from
Proposition 1 (i)(a), (i)(c), and (ii)(d). As for the dynamics of Fit, assume that Ak is not
very high and thus the same assumptions as the ones for the minority in the ﬁrst economy
(Figure 3) hold. Then, b¤(wui)=ch and b¤(wsi)=ch exist and are given by (18) and (19) with
N1=N2 and Ak1=Ak2=Ak, respectively.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of F1t and F2t. Since b
¤(wk1) = ch and b¤(wk2) = ch
(k=u; s) are symmetric with respect to the 450 line, directions of motion of F1t and F2t too
are symmetric regarding the line. Unlike Figures 3 and 4,
£
1¡s¡1
2
¢¤
Ashs+s
¡
1
2
¢
Auhu<
cs
°b
is
assumed and thus b¤(wsi)=cs intersects with the 450 line (see footnote 24).28
Now, the long-run fate of the groups depends on both F10 and F20. When (F10;F20)
is above b¤(wu1) = ch (at the right side of b¤(wu2) = ch), F1t (F2t) increases over time and
H¤1 =1 (H
¤
2 =1) in the long run. Particularly, when both F10 and F20 are high, i.e. when
b¤(wui)>ch at (F1;F2)=(F10;F20) for at least one group i and, for j 6= i, b¤(wuj)>ch at Fi=1
and Fj=Fj0, everyone is skilled in the long run. By contrast, when (F10;F20) is at the left
side of b¤(ws1)=ch (below b¤(ws2)=ch), F1t (F2t) decreases over time and H¤1 =0 (H
¤
2 =0) in
28A minor assumption, b¤(wsi)=ch and b¤(wuj)=ch (i 6=j) do not intersect, too is imposed. For F2F1 >(<)1;
b¤(wu2)=ch is located at the left (right) side of b¤(wu1)=ch since wu2> (<)wu1 from Assumption 4.
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the long run. In particular, when (F10;F20) satisﬁes both b
¤(ws1)<ch and b¤(ws2)<ch, it is
possible that nobody is skilled in the long run: a bad impression that each group has about
the other group aﬀects the skilled wage negatively, thus Fit decreases and the impression
deteriorates further. (In the area with chained lines, both F1t and F2t are constant.) Like
the previous economies, the eﬀect of initial conditions on long-run outcomes tends to be
more critical than a ”prejudice-free” economy: H¤i =Fi0 when sit=0 always.
5.1.4 Summary and discussions
Analyses have shown that the dynamics and long-run outcomes of groups, particularly of
the minority, depend greatly on groups’ initial conditions and could be quite diﬀerent from a
”prejudice-free” economy. Since good (bad) reputation tends to beget good (bad) reputation,
a group starting with a good (bad) initial condition, i.e. a high (low) fraction of them can
aﬀord skill investment initially, tend to be in a good (bad) condition in the long run. In the
ﬁrst economy, if the initial condition of the minority is good (bad), all of them are skilled
(unskilled) in the long run. In the second economy, if the condition is good (bad), not
only all of them are skilled (unskilled) but also are in the primary (secondary) sector, hence
the labor market becomes ethnically integrated (segregated) eventually. The third economy
shows that, when the two groups are similar in size, the dynamics of the majority too could
be aﬀected greatly by initial conditions.
The strong dependence on initial conditions arises because, unlike a ”prejudice-free”
economy in which the dynamics of an individual lineage are aﬀected only by the initial
condition of the lineage, they are aﬀected by initial conditions of groups too owing to the
dependence of primary-sector wages on group-level variables, reputation and the degree of
prejudice. Empirical ﬁndings support the positive and strong intergenerational association
at the group level; for example, Borjas (1994) ﬁnds that the intergenerational correlation of
mean log wages of ethnic groups (about 0.4¡0.5) is much higher than that of within-group
individual log wages (about 0.25) for the U.S. economy.
Note that main implications derived from the ﬁrst two economies remain intact even if
Ak1=Ak2 (k=u; s) holds irrespective of the relative population size. Ak1>Ak2 is assumed
for analytical simplicity as well as for reality: when Ak1 = Ak2, as in Figure 5, critical
loci exist for the majority too and thus analyses become complicated without aﬀecting
the implications. That is, the main implications hold even if the minority do not face
disadvantages in production, do not suﬀer greater disutility of work, and do not face non-
statistical discrimination in the primary sector. This applies to later analyses as well.
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5.2 When skill investment is not always proﬁtable
Section 5.1 has examined the case in which Hi = Fi always holds. Now consider the case
in which Hi=0 holds at least for one group (and equilibria are stable). From Proposition
1 (ii) (see Figure 2 too), this is true when hs¡(1+r)ch < hu and, for such group i, either
Aui¸1 and (1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]<(1+r)ch or Aui<1 and Asihs¡(1+r)ch<hu are satisﬁed.
That is, given optimal assignments to sectors, at least for such group, skill investment is
unproductive or unproﬁtable at least when the degree of prejudice si is high.
Investment decisions of the two groups are interrelated, thus, depending on Asi and Aui,
equilibrium combinations of H1 and H2 are varied and multiple equilibria are possible. To
limit possible combinations, the following is assumed.
Assumption 5 As
0¡ Ni
Ni+Nj
¢
hs¡Au0
¡
Ni
Ni+Nj
¢
hu¸0.
It states that the social return to investment in the primary sector is weakly higher for a
larger group, which is reasonable because the minority tend to have greater disadvantages in
jobs requiring high interpersonal skills usually occupied by skilled workers (e.g. management
jobs). The next proposition presents equilibrium (H1;H2) based on Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium (H1;H2) when the investment is not always proﬁtable)
Assume hs¡(1+r)ch<hu and N1¸N2.
(i)When Au2¸ 1 (thus Au1¸ 1 and As1¸As2> 1), (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]< (1+r)ch, and
As2hs¡(1+r)ch¸Au2hu,
(a) If (1¡s(0))[As1hs¡Au1hu]¸(1+r)ch, H1=F1 and both H2=F2 and H2=0 are equilibria
(H2=0 is the equilibrium) when s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
<(¸) As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu .
(b) Otherwise, (H1;H2)=(0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu for any
i; j=1; 2 (j 6= i), (H1;H2)=(F1;F2) as well.
(ii)When As2hs¡(1+r)ch<maxfAu2;1ghu, if As1hs¡(1+r)ch<maxfAu1;1ghu; (H1;H2)=(0;0),
otherwise, (H1;H2)=(F1;0).
Given optimal sectoral allocations, when the investment is not productive for the minority
(Proposition 2 (ii)), i.e., when (Au2;As2) is below the dotted line for Au2 ¸ 1 and below
As2=
hu+(1+r)ch
hs
for Au2<1 in Figure 2, they do not invest since the individual return is lower
than the social one under s2>0. Then, the majority’s individual and social returns coincide
and H1=F1 (H1= 0) when investment is productive (unproductive). Wages equal human
capital levels and the result is same as when reputation does not matter.
By contrast, when Au2¸1 (thus Au1¸1 and As1¸As2>1) and (given optimal sectoral
allocations) the investment is productive but is not proﬁtable for the minority with highest
s2 (Proposition 2 (i)), i.e. when (Au2;As2) is in the region between As2 =
hu
hs
Au2+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs
and the dotted line in Figure 2, multiple equilibria are possible, which are examined next.
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5.2.1 When investment is always proﬁtable for the majority
If the investment is always (weakly) proﬁtable for the majority, i.e. (Au1;As1) is in the region
on or above As1=
hu
hs
Au1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs (and Au1¸1) in Figure 2 (Proposition 2 (i)(a)), H1=F1
is always true, while both H2=F2 and H2=0 are equilibria (H2=0 is the equilibrium) when
F2N2
F2N2+F1N1
is strictly greater (smaller) than the value satisfying
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
= As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu : (23)
As explained after Lemma 2, multiple equilibria arise due to strategic complementarity
within the minority: as more of them invest in skill and become skilled workers, s2 decreases
and the investment becomes more proﬁtable. As for sectoral choices, since As1¸As2>1 and
Au1¸Au2¸1, psi=1 (when Hi>0) and pui=1 (i=1; 2) from Proposition 1 (ii)(d).
Suppose that the relative population N2
N1
or the relative productivity of the primary sector
is not so large that assumptions related to the dynamics of F1t and F2t are same as the ﬁrst
economy in Section 5.1 (thus F1t always increases), except that (1¡s(0))As2hs+s(0)Au2hu< ch°b
now follows from Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch. When multiple equilibria exist, assume that the initial
coordination among the minority continues for subsequent periods: for example, if H20=F20
happens to hold, then H2t = F2t for any t > 0. This assumption would be reasonable
considering that children tend to mimic parental behaviors in real society.29
Then, if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
< As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu and (H10;H20) = (F10;0) happens to be an
initial equilibrium, the minority never make productive investment, F1t rises and F2t falls
(since H2t=0 and Au2hu<
1¡°b(1+r)
°b
ch) over time, and H
¤
1 =F
¤
1 =1 and H
¤
2 =F
¤
2 =0.
Otherwise (thus (H10;H20) = (F10;F20) if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
< As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu ), the dy-
namics are as illustrated in Figure 6. The dividing line between H2=F2 and H2=0 (eq. 23)
is a positively-sloped straight line approaching the origin, and H2=0 holds below the line.
(The line is located below b¤(ws2)= ch, if b¤(ws2)= ch and b¤(wu2)= ch do not intersect.) The
dynamics of F2t when H2t =F2t are qualitatively same as the ﬁrst economy of Section 5.1
(Figure 3), while when H2t=0, F2t decreases over time.
Hence, if F20 is not so small that b
¤(ws2)¸ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20), given the initial condi-
tion, the long-run fate of the minority is drastically diﬀerent depending on which equilibrium
happens to be realized initially: if H20=F20, H
¤
2 =1 (if b
¤(wu2)>ch at (F1;F2)=(1;F20)) or
H¤2 =F20 (otherwise), whereas if H20=0, H
¤
2 =F
¤
2 =0.
30 The initial selection of good (bad)
29Relatedly, in a dynamic model of statistical discrimination, Kim and Loury (2009) assume that, when
there exist equilibrium paths to both good and bad steady states, an initial consensus on the ﬁnal state
shared by group members picks one path and the consensus is maintained over generations.
30When Au2<1 <As2; (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]<(1+r)ch, and As2hs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu (the case not considered
in the proposition or Corollary 1, see Figure 2), the dynamics are illustrated by a ﬁgure similar to Figure
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Figure 6: Dynamics when H2t=F2t is selected in the region where both H2t=0 and H2t=F2t
are equilibria
equilibrium brings the better (worse) long-run outcome than under si=0.
5.2.2 When investment is not always proﬁtable for both groups
If the investment is not always proﬁtable for the majority too, i.e. (Au1;As1) is in the region
between As1=
hu
hs
Au1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs and the dotted line in Figure 2 (Proposition 2 (i)(b)), equilib-
ria are (H1;H2)=(0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu for any i; j=1; 2,
(H1;H2) = (F1;F2) too. (psi = pui = 1 as before.) (H1;H2) = (0;F2); (F1;0) are equilibria
because strategic substitutability is at work between the groups: as more individuals of one
group invest, prejudice toward the other group increases and their return to investment falls.
As in the previous economy, assumptions related to the dynamics of Fit are same as the ﬁrst
economy in Section 5.1, and the initial coordination continues for subsequent periods when
multiple equilibria exist.
Then, if only the minority (majority) happen to make productive investment initially,
i.e. H10 = 0 and H20 = F20 (H10 = F10 and H20 = 0), F2t is constant (falls) and F1t rises
and H¤1 = 0(= 1) and H
¤
2 = F20(= 0). Since this type of equilibria exist for any F10 and
F20, it is possible that the majority with a much better initial condition than the minority,
6. Diﬀerences are that no stable equilibria exist, not H2 = 0, in the region on or below s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
=
As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu , and in the region above the line, pu2<1 is possible depending on F1 and F2 like Figure
4. Hence, if s
¡
F20N2
F10N1+F20N2
¢
< As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu and s
¡
F20N2
N1+F20N2
¢ ¸ As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu , F1t rises and
Hit=Fit (i=1; 2) at ﬁrst, but after the economy crosses the line, the stable equilibrium fails to exist.
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i.e. F10>>F20, end up with the smaller fraction of skilled workers, i.e. H
¤
1 =0<H
¤
2 =F20
(F ¤1 = 1 > F
¤
2 = F20, though). If s
¡
Fi0Ni
Fi0Ni+Fj0Nj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu for any i; j = 1; 2 and
(H10;H20) = (F10; F20) happens to hold, the dynamics are similar to those illustrated in
Figure 6.31 Unlike the previous economy, the long-run outcome of the majority too is sensitive
to the initial selection of equilibrium given the initial condition.
5.2.3 Summary and discussions
To summarize, when workers are more productive in the primary sector and (given optimal
sectoral allocations) skill investment is productive but is not proﬁtable with highest si at
least for the minority, multiple equilibria could exist regarding skill investment, and given
the initial distribution of wealth, the initial selection of equilibrium could aﬀect the dynamics
greatly. When the investment is proﬁtable for the majority, it can be the case that, if the
minority with enough wealth happen to (not to) invest initially, F2t increases (decreases) over
time and all of the minority are skilled (unskilled) in the long run. When the investment
is not proﬁtable with high si for the majority too, given the initial condition, the long-run
outcome of the majority too is sensitive to the initial selection of equilibrium. The majority
with a much better initial condition than the minority could end up with the smaller fraction
of skilled workers, if the majority (minority) happen not to (to) invest initially.
The results suggest that, in an economy where prejudice is severe (s(0) is high) or the
productivity of skill investment is low, if the initial selection is aﬀected by institutional-
ized discrimination against one group that limits their access to investment opportunities,
such discrimination could have a lasting impact on their well-beings well after its abol-
ishment. Income or wealth redistribution raising Fi does little to change the situation,
while aﬃrmative action that treats them favorably in investment, such as tuition subsidy,
can be very eﬀective. To be successful, their ch must be lowered so that, for any group,
(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]¸ (1+r)ch holds and thus Hi = Fi becomes the unique equilibrium
(Corollary 1). Redistribution becomes eﬀective only after such policy is implemented. As
in Section 5.1, the main implications of the analysis remain intact even when Ak1 = Ak2
(k=u; s) always holds.
31Diﬀerences are that another positively-sloped straight line, s
¡
F1N1
F1N1+F2N2
¢
=As1hs¡Au1hu¡(1+r)chAs1hs¡Au1hu , exists
above the 450 line, and the equilibrium (H1;H2) = (F1;F2) exists only in the region between this line and
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
=As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu (the dotted bold line). The economy is in this region and F1t increases
at ﬁrst. If s
¡
F20N2
N1+F20N2
¢¸As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)chAs2hs¡Au2hu , the economy crosses the dotted bold line at some point, after
which the equilibrium switches to (H1t;H2t)=(0;F2t) or (F1t;0). If a group with smaller Fit is assumed to
switch to Hit =0, as in the ﬁgure, F2t continues to decline and H¤2 =F
¤
2 =0 and H
¤
1 =1 in the long run.
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6 General case
Analyses so far are performed under Assumption 1 (ii), Asi ¸ huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs , Asihs¡
Auihu¸ hs¡hu(1¡s(0)) . When s(0) is high or when the relative productivity of skill investment in
the primary sector, Asihs¡Auihu
hs¡hu , is low, however, the assumption does not hold. Hence, it is
dropped now. The assumption implies that the net return to choosing the primary sector
is weakly higher for skilled workers even when the degree of prejudice is severest (si=s(0))
and thus psi¸ pui always holds. Without it, it is possible that psi=0 and pui=1 hold, i.e.
all skilled workers choose the secondary sector and all unskilled workers choose the primary
sector, even if the former have comparative advantages and are more productive in the
primary sector. Further, multiple equilibria could exist regarding sectoral choices of skilled
workers as well as skill investment. Hence, the initial selection of equilibrium on sectoral
choices too could have lasting impacts on the dynamics.
6.1 Sectoral choices and skill investment
To analyze the model without Assumption 1 (ii), this subsection examines sectoral choices
and skill investment when the assumption does not hold. Assumption 1 (ii) is replaced by:
Assumption 6 s(0)> (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , Asi< huhsAui+ hs¡hu(1¡s(0))hs :
As in Section 3.1, Assumptions 3 through 5 are not imposed in this subsection.
The following lemma on sectoral choices is parallel to Lemma 1 under the old assumption.
Lemma 3 (Sectoral choices under Assumption 6) Suppose Hi>0 and psjHj>0, j 6= i.
(i)When Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, pui = 1. psi = 1 if s(0) · (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ; both psi = 1 and psi = 0 if
s(0)> (Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; otherwise, psi=0.
(ii)When Asi>1>Aui,
(a) If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1,si=s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ,
psi=1 and pui is determined as in Lemma 1 (ii).
(b) Otherwise, psi = pui = 1 if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , or else, no stable equilib-
rium exists.
(iii)When Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, as in Lemma 1 (iii), psi=pui=0.
When Asi¸Aui¸1, unskilled workers always choose the primary sector as before, while
choices of skilled workers now depend on the net return to the primary sector: if it is positive
with psi=1, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , psi=1 as before, whereas if it is negative
with psi=0, i.e. s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu , psi=0.
32 That is, when s(0) or hs
hu
is suﬃciently high,
all skilled workers choose the secondary sector and all unskilled workers choose the primary
32An equilibrium with psi2 (0;1) is not stable because the net return for the skilled increases with psi.
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sector, even if skilled workers have comparative advantages and are more productive in the
primary sector. Since s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< s(0), both psi = 1 and psi = 0 are equilibria for
some combinations of Asi and Aui due to strategic complementarity among skilled workers
(their net return increases with psi). When Asi> 1>Aui and the net return with psi=1 is
weakly lower for skilled workers, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , if the return for the
skilled (with psi= pui=1) is positive, psi= pui=1 holds, otherwise (thus psi< 1), no stable
equilibrium exists : psi=0 cannot be an equilibrium from Asi>1>Aui, while an equilibrium
with psi 2 (0;1) is not stable due to strategic complementarity. Choices are same as the
corresponding cases of Lemma 1, when Asi>1>Aui and the net return with psi=1 is higher
for skilled workers, and when Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1.
Based on Lemma 3, the next lemma presents equilibrium values of Hi, which corresponds
to Lemma 2 under the original assumption.
Lemma 4 (Skill investment under Assumption 6) Suppose Fi>0.
(i)When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu; Hi=Fi if psjHj=0 for j 6= i. If psjHj>0,
(a)When Asi¸Aui¸1,
1: If hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, Hi=Fi.
2: If hs¡(1+r)ch<Auihu, Hi=Fi when s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ; both Hi=Fi and Hi=0
are equilibria when s(0)> Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu >s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
; or else, Hi=0.
(b)When Asi > 1 > Aui, if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< min
©
max
£ (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¤
;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
, Hi=Fi, otherwise, no stable equilibrium exists.
(c) If Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, Hi=Fi.
(ii)When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Lemma 2 (ii) applies (no case s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ; however).
When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Hi is same as before except that the case s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu
of Lemma 2 (ii)(a) does not arise now. By contrast, when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, Hi=Fi always
under the old assumption, while ineﬃcient Hi=0 can be an equilibrium and stable equilibria
may not exist under the new assumption. When Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, psi = 0 or 1 and pui = 1
from Lemma 3 (i). Hence, if the net return to investment is non-negative even under psi=0
and pui=1 (the return is lower than under psi= pui=1), i.e. hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, Hi=Fi
holds; otherwise, when the net return with Hi=0 is negative even under psi=pui=1, Hi=0
holds, while when the net return with Hi=Fi is positive under psi= pui=1, Hi=Fi holds
(and both Hi = 0 and Hi = Fi are equilibria when both conditions hold due to strategic
complementarity). When Asi>1>Aui, no stable equilibria exist if stable psi and pui do not
exist, which is when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸max£ (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¤
from Lemma
3 (ii)(b), or if stable Hi does not exist, which is when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
(otherwise, Hi=Fi). Stable Hi fails to exist in such case since the net return under Hi=0
is higher than under Hi>0 after the dependence of pui on Hi is taken into account (psi=1
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always from Lemma 3 (ii)): given Hi = 0, pui = 0 from Aui < 1 and thus Hi = 0 is not an
equilibrium from Asihs¡(1+r)ch>hu, whereas, givenHi2(0; Fi], the net return is non-positive
under pui>0 and thus Hi2(0; Fi] is not a stable equilibrium.33
Finally, investment and sectoral choices of group i for given choices by the other group
under Assumption 6 are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 (Investment and sectoral choices of group i under Assumption 6)
(i)When hs¡(1+r)ch¸ hu, if psjHj =0 for j 6= i, Hi=Fi and Proposition 1 (i)(c) applies
for psi and pui. If psjHj>0 (thus si>0),
(a)When Asi¸Aui¸1, pui=1.
1:When hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, Hi=Fi. psi=1 if s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, both psi=1
and psi=0 are equilibria if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; or else psi=0.
2:When hs¡(1+r)ch < Auihu (thus Aui > 1), if s(0) · Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu , Hi = Fi and
psi = 1; otherwise, both Hi = 0 and Hi = Fi, psi = 1 are equilibria if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , or else Hi=0.
(b)When Asi>1>Aui,
1: If s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi, psi=1, and Proposition 1 (i)(a) applies
for pui.
2: Otherwise, if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< min
© (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
, Hi = Fi and
psi=pui=1; or else, no stable equilibrium exists.
(c)When Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, as in Proposition 1 (i)(b), Hi=Fi and psi=pui=0.
(ii)When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, Proposition 1 (ii) applies (no case s(0)· Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu ).
If hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, investment and sectoral choices when psjHj>0 (j 6= i) are as illustrated
in Figure 7. When Aui¸ 1, if hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu , Aui· hs¡(1+r)chhu , Hi=Fi, pui=1, and,
depending on Asi and Aui, psi = 0, both psi = 0 and psi = 1, or psi = 1 (sectoral choices of
the skilled are ineﬃcient when psi=0), while if Aui>
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
, the choices are same as the
case of hs¡(1+r)ch<hu under Assumption 1 (ii) (see Figure 2) and Hi=0 is possible (then,
investment is ineﬃcient). When Aui<1 and stable equilibria exist, they are determined as
in the corresponding case under the old assumption (see Figure 1). (The diﬀerence is that
stable equilibria do not exist for some combinations of Asi>1 and Aui<1.)
If hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, the choices are very similar to the corresponding case under Assumption
1 (ii), thus they are mostly as illustrated in Figure 2.34 (The only diﬀerence is that, when
Aui¸1, the region in which Hi=Fi is the unique equilibrium does not arise now.)
33Since s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)chAsihs¡Auihu > (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu , pui =0 cannot be true from Lemma 3 (ii)
and Lemma 1 (ii).
34Note that Hi=Fi is possible under the new assumption as well: when hs¡ (1¡s(0))(1+r)cs<hu, the
dotted line below the area with slanting lines in Figure 2 is located below the bold solid line dividing the
regions satisfying Assumption 1 (ii) and Assumption 6.
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Figure 7: Investment and sectoral choices under Assumption 6 when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu and
psjHj>0 (j 6= i)
6.2 Analyses
The dynamics are examined without imposing Assumption 1 (ii), based on results of the
previous subsection and Section 3.1. Qualitatively new dynamics arise when Asi¸1, Aui2£
1;hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
¤
(thus, hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu), s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu , and Assumption 6 hold for at least
one group i (the region below the upper dashed double-dotted line in Figure 7), and Auj¸1
or Assumption 1 (ii) holds for the other group j.35
For example, consider an economy in whichAs2>1, Au22
£
1;hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
¤
, s(0)> (As2¡1)hs
As2hs¡Au2hu ,
and Assumption 6 hold for the minority (group 2), and either Au1 >
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
and As1 ¸
35The dynamics are similar to Section 5 in other cases. When hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, analyses of the corresponding
case in Section 5 go through from Proposition 3 (ii). When hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, if Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1 for
some i, as before, pui=0 and either psi=0 or psjHj=0 for j 6= i from Propositions 3 (i) and 1 (i), thus either
sj=0; si=0; or psi=psj=0 and analyses are simple. Otherwise, when either Aui¸1 and s(0)· (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu
(the region on or above the upper dashed double-dotted line in Figure 7) or Aui>
hs¡(1+r)ch
hu
is true for any
i, analyses in Section 5 apply, while when Assumption 6 and Asi>1>Aui hold for some i and thus stable
equilibria fail to exist depending on Fi, analyses in footnote 30 of Section 5.2 apply.
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hu
hs
Au1+
(1+r)ch
(1¡s(0))hs or Au1 ¸ 1 and Assumption 1 (ii) hold for the majority (group 1). This
is the case in which skill investment is productive even in the secondary sector, all workers
are more productive in the primary sector but As2 and Al2 are low, and s(0) is high. From
Figures 7 and 1, Hi=Fi, pui=1 (i=1; 2), and ps1=1, while ps2 is 0 or 1. From Proposition
3 (i)(a)1., the dividing line between the region ps2=0; 1 and the region ps2=0 is:
s
¡
F2N2
F1N1+F2N2
¢
(1¡F2)= (As2¡1)hsAs2hs¡Au2hu : (24)
Suppose that N2
N1
or the relative productivity of the primary sector is not very high so that
assumptions on the dynamics are same as the ﬁrst economy in Section 5.1, implying that
F1t increases and, when ps2=1, b
¤(ws2)=ch (eq. 19) and b¤(wu2)=ch (eq. 18) exist. To make
results more interesting, assume hs <
ch
°b
and thus F2t falls when ps2t = 0. When multiple
equilibria exist, initial coordination continues for subsequent periods as in Section 5.2.
Then, if s
¡
F2 0N2
F1 0N1+F2 0N2
¢
(1¡F20)< (As2¡1)hsAs2hs¡Au2hu holds, i.e. both ps20 = 0 and ps20 = 1 are
equilibria, and ps20=0 happens to be realized initially, F1t rises and F2t falls over time and
H¤1 = 1 and H
¤
2 =0 in the long run. Although the skilled minority are more productive in
the primary sector, they choose the secondary sector to avoid the negative eﬀect from the
unskilled minority. The sector’s wage, however, is not high enough for their descendants to
remain skilled and the minority are totally unskilled in the long run.
Instead, if ps20=1 happens to be realized under the same situation, the dynamics of F1t
and F2t are as illustrated in Figure 8.
36The skilled minority eﬃciently choose the primary
sector and earn the higher wage than the previous case. In particular, if F20 is high enough
that b¤(wu2)>ch at (F1;F2)= (1;F20), F2t starts to increase at some point and H¤1 =H
¤
2 =1
in the long run. The unskilled minority beneﬁt from the presence of the skilled minority in
the primary sector, which enables the upward mobility of their descendants.
Given the initial condition, the long-run fate of the minority is very diﬀerent depending on
the initial selection of ps20. The result suggests that initial institutionalized discrimination
against the group limiting their access to skilled jobs in the primary sector could have a
lasting negative impact on their well-beings well after its abolishment. Aﬃrmative action
treating them favorably in the sector, such as wage subsidy making ps2 = 1 the unique
equilibrium, can be very eﬀective to change the situation.
36From (24), the dividing line (the dashed line) is positively sloped and approaches the origin (note
s(0)> (As2¡1)hsAs2hs¡Au2hu ). (F10; F20) is above the dividing line since ps2=1 is possible only in the region above
the line. Shapes of b¤(ws2)=ch and b¤(wu2)=ch are as explained in Section 5.
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Figure 8: Dynamics when ps2t=1 is selected in the region where both ps2t=0 and ps2t=1
are equilibria
7 Conclusions
Disparities in economic outcomes among diﬀerent ethnic, racial, or religious groups continue
to be serious concerns in most economies. Relative economic standings of diﬀerent groups
are rather persistent, although some groups initially in disadvantaged positions successfully
caught up with then-advantaged groups. Two obstacles, costly skill investment and negative
stereotypes or discriminations in the labor market, seem to distort investment and sectoral
decisions and slow down the economic progress of the disadvantaged.
This paper has developed a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in which these
obstacles aﬀect skill investment and sectoral choices of individuals of two groups and exam-
ined how initial economic standings of the groups and initial institutionalized discrimination
aﬀect subsequent dynamics. The model economy has (up to) two sectors, the primary sector
that is ethnically mixed and group reputation aﬀects wages due to statistical discrimination,
and the secondary sector with the contrasting features.
Main results are summarized as follows. First, sectoral choices and skill investment may
not be socially optimal because choices of diﬀerent individuals within and across groups
could be interrelated. Second, multiple equilibria could exist regarding skill investment and
sectoral choices of skilled workers: both the non-poor of a group invest (skilled workers
choose the primary sector) and do not could be equilibria. Third, the dynamics and long-
run outcomes of groups, particularly of the minority, depend greatly on initial conditions
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and could be quite diﬀerent from a ”prejudice-free” economy. Since good (bad) reputation
tends to beget good (bad) reputation, a group starting with a good (bad) initial condition
tend to be in a good (bad) position in the long run. Fourth, when multiple equilibria exist,
which is the case when the eﬀect of stereotypes is strong or the productivity of human
capital investment is low, given initial conditions, the initial selection of equilibrium could
aﬀect the dynamics greatly. The result suggests that, if the initial selection is aﬀected by
institutionalized discrimination limiting one group’s access to skill investment or skilled jobs
in the primary sector, the discrimination could have a lasting impact on their well-beings
well after its abolishment. Income or wealth redistribution does little to change the situation,
while aﬃrmative action could aﬀect the dynamics greatly.
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Appendix Proofs of lemmas and propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) If psi>0, psi=pui=1 is the only stable equilibrium because
(1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸(1¡s(0))Asihs+s(0)E[Akihk]¡hs (25)
¸(1¡s(0))Auihu+s(0)E[Akihk]¡hu (26)
¸(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu (27)
> [(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+siAuihu=(Aui¡1)hu¸0, (28)
where the second inequality is from Assumption 1(ii) and the fourth inequality is from psi>0.
If psi=0, pui=0 must hold from (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu.
However, psi= pui=0 is not an equilibrium when Asi>1 (skilled workers deviate), and it is
not stable when Asi=1(=Aui) (the unskilled deviate whenever psi increases).
(ii) As shown in (i), (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs¸ (1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu. Thus,
if psi =0, pui =0 must hold, which, as shown in (i), is not an equilibrium from Asi > 1. If
psi2 (0;1) and thus si<s(0), (27) holds with strict inequality and pui=0 must hold, which,
however, is not an equilibrium from Asi>1. Thus, if an equilibrium exists, psi=1 and the net
return to the primary sector for the unskilled is (1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu=[(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+
si
HiAsihs+pui(1¡Hi)Auihu
Hi+pui(1¡Hi) , which is decreasing in pui. Hence, pui = 0 when the return is non-
positive with pui=0, i.e. [(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+siAsihs·0, si· (1¡Aui)huAsihs¡Auihu ; pui=1 when it is non-
negative with pui=1, i.e. [(1¡si)Aui¡1]hu+si[HiAsihs+(1¡Hi)Auihu]¸0, si¸ 1Hi
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
otherwise, pui 2 (0;1) and the value of pui is obtained by solving the zero return condition.
Such pui and psi=1 is an equilibrium when pui=0 from Asi>1 (and the above condition for
the return) and when pui>0 from (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu.
When pui=0 (pui=1) and the return for the unskilled is negative (positive), such equilibrium
is stable since the return for the skilled is positive. In other cases, it is stable because the
return for the skilled is positive and the return for the unskilled decreases with pui.
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(iii) When Asi=1, psi>0 only if pui=0, which, however, is not stable regarding a small
increase in pui. psi=0 and pui>0 is not an equilibrium from Aui<1. Thus, psi=pui=0 is the
equilibrium when Asi=1, which is stable because the return for the skilled becomes negative
whenever pui increases. When Asi<1, (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs· [(1¡si)Asi¡1]hs+siAsihs=
(Asi¡1)hs<0 and thus psi=pui=0, which is clearly stable.
Proof of Lemma 2. (Proof when psjHj =0 for j 6= i) Hi=Fi(= 0) iﬀ max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+
r)ch¡max[Aui; 1]hu¸ (<)0 from Assumption 2. (i) max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+r)ch¡max[Aui; 1]hu¸
hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu ¸ 0, where the ﬁrst inequality is from Assumption 1 (i). (ii)(a)/(b) Since
Asi>1, max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+r)ch¡max[Aui; 1]hu=Asihs¡(1+r)ch¡max[Aui; 1]hu, which equals
Asihs¡(1+r)ch¡hu¸ 0 when Aui< 1. When Aui¸ 1 it equals Asihs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu. (c)
max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+r)ch¡max[Aui; 1]hu·max[Asi; 1]hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu<0.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi> 0 when psjHj > 0) (i) Given Hi> 0, if the condition of
Lemma 1 (iii) holds and thus psi=pui=0, the net return to investment is non-negative, i.e.
hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu¸ 0, and thus phi=1 from Assumption 2. If the condition of (i) or (ii) of
the lemma holds, psi=1 given Hi>0. Thus, when pui>0, (1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch>
(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch¸hs¡hu¡(1+r)ch¸0 from Assumption 1 (ii) (thus phi=1).
When pui=0, since Asi>1 from the lemma, (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡(1+r)ch=Asihs¡(1+r)ch>
hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu. Hence, when hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu, Hi=phiFi=Fi is the only equilibrium with
Hi>0, which exists for any Asi and Aui and is clearly stable.
(ii) (a)/(b) Since Asi > 1, given Hi > 0, psi = 1 from Lemma 1 (i) and (ii) and thus
si is independent of psi and equals s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
. When pui = 0, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢ ·
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu from Lemma 1 (ii) (occurs only in (b)), Asihs¡(1+r)ch ¸ hu and thus phi = 1
from Assumption 2. When pui> 0, i.e. s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
> (1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , the net return equals£
1¡s¡ HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢¤
(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch and thus, if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢· (>)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu ,
phi=1(=0) from Assumption 2. Note that
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu ¸
(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu from Asihs¡(1+
r)ch¸hu. Hence, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
> Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , the net return is negative for any
Hi2(0; Fi] and thus an equilibrium with Hi>0 does not exist, while when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi>0 because the net return
is increasing in Hi (when s(0) >
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , another equilibrium with Hi 2 (0; Fi)
exists but is not stable). Similarly, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
= Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the
only equilibrium with Hi>0 but is not stable.
(c) Since the skilled (unskilled) wage is lower (higher) under si>0 than under si=0, the
net return to the investment cannot exceed the maximum return under si=0, max[Asi; 1]hs¡
(1+r)ch¡hu, which is negative. Hence, Hi>0 is not an equilibrium.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi=0 when psjHj>0) Given Hi=0, if Aui<1 (thus pui=0),
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the net return is max[Asi; 1]hs¡ (1+r)ch¡hu, which is ¸ 0 in (i) and (ii)(b) and < 0 in
(ii)(c). Hence, Hi = 0 is not an equilibrium in (i) and (ii)(b) (when the net return is 0,
phi = 1 from Assumption 2), while it is an equilibrium in (ii)(c). Given Hi = 0, if Aui ¸ 1
(thus Asi¸1 from Assumption 1 (i)), the net return is max[(1¡si)Asihs+siAuihu; hs]¡(1+
r)ch¡Auihu=maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]; hs¡Auihug¡(1+r)ch=(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]
¡(1+r)ch¸hs¡hu¡(1+r)ch from Assumption 1 (ii) and Aui¸1. Thus, in (i), Hi=0 is not
an equilibrium when Aui ¸ 1 too (note Assumption 2). In (ii), the net return is negative
(non-negative) when s(0)>(·)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu . Hence, Hi=0 is (is not) an equilibrium if
s(0)>(·)Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu in (ii)(a) and is an equilibrium in (ii)(c). In (ii)(c), equilibrium
Hi = 0 is stable since, as shown above, the net return when Hi > 0 is always negative. It
is stable in (ii)(a) too since s(0)> Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu implies that the net return is negative
with small Hi>0 (since Aui¸1, given Hi>0, psi=pui=1 from Lemma 1 (i)).
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Hi=Fi from Lemma 2 (i), thus Lemma 1 applies with Hi=Fi.
(ii)(a)/(b) The value of Hi is from Lemma 2 (ii)(a)/(b). (c) Hi=0 is from Lemma 2 (ii)(b).
(d) Lemma 1(iii) does not apply since Hi=Fi only if Asihs¡(1+r)ch¸hu (thus Asi>1).
Proof of Proposition 2. When (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]¸(1+r)ch and As2hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu,
the same condition holds for the majority (group 1) from Assumption 5, which is the case
covered in Section 5.1. When Au2<1, (1¡s(0))[As2hs¡Au2hu]<(1+r)ch, and As2hs¡(1+r)ch¸hu
(thus As2 > 1), given ps1H1 > 0, stable H2 does not exist for some F2 from Proposition 1
(ii)(b). Given ps1H1=H1=0 (ps1=1 when H1=F1 from As1¸As2> 1), H2=F2 from the
proposition, but (H1;H2) = (0;F2) is an equilibrium for any F1 and F2 only when Au1 ¸ 1,
(1¡s(0))[As1hs¡Au1hu]< (1+r)c, and As1hs¡(1+r)ch¸Au1huh (see Figure 2), and H1 =0
happens to hold (H1=F1 too could hold depending on F1 and F2) from Assumption 5 and
Proposition 1 (ii)(a). Hence, equilibria that are stable for any F1 and F2 may not exist and
thus this case is not considered in the proposition (brieﬂy discussed in footnote 30).
(i) Since As1 ¸ As2 > 1, from Proposition 1 (ii)(d), psi = 1 when Hi > 0 (i = 1; 2).
Then, from Proposition 1 (ii)(a), given ps1H1 =H1 = 0, H2 = F2, and given H1 > 0, both
H2 = F2 and H2 = 0 (H2 = 0) when s
¡
F2N2
F2N2+H1N1
¢
< (¸) As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu . (a) In this
case, from Proposition 1 (ii)(a), H1 = F1 always. Hence, H1 = F1 and both H2 = F2 and
H2=0 are equilibria (H2=0 is the equilibrium) when s
¡
F2N2
F2N2+F1N1
¢
<(¸) As2hs¡Au2hu¡(1+r)ch
As2hs¡Au2hu .
(b) In this case, given H2; the value of H1 is determined in the same way as H2. Hence,
(H1;H2)=(0;F2); (F1;0); and, when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+FjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu for any i; j=1; 2 (j 6= i),
(H1;H2) = (F1;F2) as well. (ii) From Proposition 1 (ii)(a) and (c), H2 = 0 always. Then,
from Proposition 1 (ii), given H2=0, H1=0 either when Au1¸1 and As1hs¡(1+r)ch<Au1hu
or when Au1<1 and As1hs¡(1+r)ch<hu, and otherwise, H1=F1.
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Proof of Lemma 3. (iii) The proof of Lemma 1 (iii) does not rely on Assumption 1(ii)
and thus the same result as the lemma holds with Assumption 6.
(i)/(ii) An equilibrium with psi 2 (0;1) and pui = 1, if exists, is not stable, because the
return to the primary sector for the skilled becomes positive whenever psi increases. An
equilibrium with psi 2 (0;1) and pui = 0, which can occur only when Asi = 1, is not stable
since the return for the skilled becomes negative whenever pui increases. An equilibrium with
psi; pui2(0;1), which satisﬁes (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs=(1¡si)Auihu+siE[Akihk]¡hu=0,
is not stable because, whenever psi increases and pui non-increases, the return for the skilled
becomes positive and psi does not have a tendency to return to the original value: the eﬀect
of psi on the return for the skilled is greater than for the unskilled from Asihs>Auihu and
the eﬀect of pui on the return is same for both types of workers.
Thus, if a stable equilibrium exists, psi=0 or 1. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1 (i),
psi = pui = 0 cannot be a stable equilibrium. psi = 0 and pui 2 (0;1) is not an equilibrium
when Aui 6=1, while it is not stable when Aui=1 (since the return for the unskilled becomes
positive whenever psi increases). psi = 0 and pui = 1 is not an equilibrium when Aui <
1. When Aui ¸ 1, it is a stable equilibrium if the return for the skilled is negative, i.e.
(1¡s(0))Asihs+s(0)Auihu¡hs<0, s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu , because the return for the unskilled
is positive (when Aui > 1) or it increases whenever psi increases (when Aui = 1). (When
s(0)= (Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu , it is not stable since the returns for the skilled increases with psi.)
As for possible equilibria with psi=1, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1,
s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , the proof of Lemma 1 (i) and (ii) can be applied with a
slight modiﬁcation, thus the result of the lemma holds. If (1¡si)Asihs¡hs·(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with
psi=1, s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , psi·pui and thus pui=1 must hold. psi=pui=1
is a stable equilibrium when (1¡si)Asihs+siE[Akihk]¡hs = (1¡si)Asihs+si[HiAsihs+(1¡
Hi)Auihu]¡hs > 0 with psi = 1 , s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , since the returns for
both types are positive. When s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
= (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , it is not stable because the
return for the skilled falls with a decrease in psi. (When (1¡si)Asihs¡hs=(1¡si)Auihu¡hu
with psi = 1, the additional reason is that the eﬀect of psi on the return for the skilled is
greater than for the unskilled and the eﬀect of pui on the returns are same.)
To summarize, when Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, since (Asi¡1)hs(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ¸
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , psi =
pui = 1 if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) and psi = 0 and pui = 1 if s(0) >
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu .
Hence, because s(0)> (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu (from Assumption 6),
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu ·
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ,
and s(0) > s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
hold, the stable equilibrium(a) is psi = pui = 1 when s(0) ·
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu ; both psi=pui=1 and psi=0; pui=1 when s(0)>
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ; and psi=0 and pui=1 otherwise.
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When Asi > 1 > Aui, if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , the result of Lemma 1 (ii)
applies, while if s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢ ¸ (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , the stable equilibrium is psi = pui = 1
when s
¡
HiNi
HiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Hi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , otherwise, no stable equilibrium exists.
Proof of Lemma 4. (Proof when psjHj=0 for j 6= i) The proof of Lemma 2 applies.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi>0 when psjHj>0)
(i)(a)/(b) When Asi¸Aui¸1 or Asi>1>Aui, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs>(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with
psi=1 and Hi=Fi; and psi=1 for given Hi=Fi hold, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
(from Lemma 3 (i) and (ii)), the corresponding part of Lemma 2 (i) applies and thusHi=Fi is
the only stable equilibrium with Hi > 0.
37 Instead, if (1¡ si)Asihs¡hs · (1¡ si)Auihu¡
hu with psi = 1 and Hi = Fi and psi = 1 for given Hi = Fi hold, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢ 2£
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ;
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu)
¢
(from Lemma 3 (i) and (ii)), psi=pui=1 from the lemma
and the net return to investment with Hi=Fi equals
£
1¡s¡ FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¤
(Asihs¡Auihu)¡(1+r)ch.
Hence, if the return is positive, i.e. if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is the only
stable equilibrium with Hi> 0, otherwise, no stable equilibrium with Hi> 0 exists. (If the
return is positive, an equilibrium with Hi2(0; Fi) too may exist, and if it is zero, Hi=Fi is
the only equilibrium with Hi>0, both of which are not stable.) Finally, when Asi¸Aui¸1,
if psi = 0 for Hi = Fi holds, i.e. s(0) >
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu (from Lemma 3 (i)), the net return is
hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu, thus, if it is non-negative, Hi =Fi is the only stable equilibrium with
Hi>0 (note Assumption 2), otherwise, no stable equilibrium with Hi>0 exists.
To summarize, when Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, Hi = Fi if hs¡ (1 + r)ch ¸ Auihu and s(0) >
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu or if s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<min
©
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
. Note that, when
hs¡(1+r)ch¸Auihu, min
©
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª¸ (Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and thus Hi=Fi
always. Hence, when Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, Hi = Fi if hs¡ (1+r)ch ¸ Auihu or if hs¡ (1+r)ch <
Auihu and s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu . When Asi > 1 > Aui, if
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ¸
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , Hi = Fi when s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu ; otherwise, Hi = Fi if
s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
<min
©
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu
ª
.
(i)(c) When Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, psi=pui=0 from Lemma 3 (iii), thus the net
return equals hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu¸0 and Hi=Fi is the only stable equilibrium with Hi>0.
(ii) When Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1 or Asi > 1 > Aui, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs > (1¡si)Auihu¡hu with
psi=1 and Hi=Fi and psi=1 for Hi=Fi hold, i.e. s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu holds
(see the proof of (i)(a)/(b)), the corresponding part of the proof of Lemma 2 (ii) applies.
37To be exact, if s(0)> (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu , for given Fi, there exists
eHi 2 (0; Fi) such that s¡ eHiNieHiNi+psjHjNj¢=
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
(1¡ eHi)(Asihs¡Auihu) , and when Asi ¸ Aui ¸ 1, psi = 0 and pui = 1 is the only equilibrium for Hi 2 (0; eHi].
However, such Hi (phi2(0; 1)) is not an equilibrium because the net return equals hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu (note
Assumption 2). The same reasoning applies to the next case and the corresponding cases of (ii) too.
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In particular, since Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu <
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , Hi=Fi is a stable equilibrium in
the same cases as Lemma 2 (ii) (a)/(b), except that now s(0) · Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu is not
possible from Assumption 6. No equilibrium with Hi>0 exists in the remaining cases: when
Asi¸Aui¸1 or Asi>1>Aui, if (1¡si)Asihs¡hs·(1¡si)Auihu¡hu with psi=1 and Hi=Fi and
psi=1 hold, pui=1 and the net return is (1¡si)[Asihs¡Auihu]¡(1+r)ch·hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu<0; when
Asi¸Aui¸1, if psi=0 , pui=1 and the net return is hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu·hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu<0;
and when Aui<Asi=1 or Aui·Asi<1, psi=pui=0.
(Existence/nonexistence of Hi=0 when psjHj>0) Given Hi=0, if Aui<1 (thus pui=0),
the corresponding part of the proof of Lemma 2 applies and thus Hi=0 is not an equilibrium
in (i)(b) and (c) and when Aui< 1 in (ii). Given Hi =0, if Aui¸ 1 (thus Asi¸ 1), the net
return is maxf(1¡si)Asihs+siAuihu; hsg¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu=maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]; hs¡
Auihug¡(1+r)ch<hs¡(1+r)ch¡hu. Thus, Hi=0 is always an equilibrium when Aui¸1 in (ii),
while it is (is not) an equilibrium if maxf(1¡s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu]; hs¡Auihug¡(1+r)ch <(¸)0
in (i)(a). That is, Hi = 0 if (1¡ s(0))[Asihs¡Auihu] < hs¡Auihu , s(0) > (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu
and hs¡ (1+ r)ch < Auihu; or if s(0) · (Asi¡1)hsAsihs¡Auihu and s(0) >
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu . Since
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu >
Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu , hs¡(1+r)ch <Auihu, Hi = 0 if hs¡(1+r)ch <Auihu and
s(0)> Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu in (i)(a).
Proof of Proposition 3. (When psjHj=0 for j 6= i) Since Hi, psi, and pui are determined
independent of s(¢), the corresponding result of Proposition 1 applies.
(When psjHj>0) (i)(a)1 From Lemmas 4 (i)(a)1 and 3 (i). (a)2 From Lemmas 4 (i)(a)2
and 3 (i). Note that psi=1 when Hi=Fi, since, if psi=0, Hi=0 from hs¡(1+r)ch¡Auihu<0.
(b)1 From Lemmas 4 (i)(b) and 3 (ii)(a) and Proposition 1 (i)(a). (b)2 From Lemmas 4 (i)(b)
and 3 (ii)(b). (Since s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢¸ (Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu , max
£ (Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) ;
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu
¤
=
(Asi¡1)hs
(1¡Fi)(Asihs¡Auihu) .)(c)From Lemmas 4 (i)(c) and 3 (iii).
(ii) The determination of Hi is from Lemma 4 (ii). When Hi = 0, psi and pui are
determined independent of s(¢) and the corresponding result of Proposition 1 applies. When
Hi = Fi, from Lemma 4 (ii) and thus Lemma 2 (ii), Asihs¡ (1+r)ch ¸ hu (thus Asi > 1)
and s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu must hold. Hence, when Aui¸ 1, psi= pui=1 from
Lemma 3 (i), since s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu <
(Asi¡1)hs
Asihs¡Auihu and Hi = 0 holds if
psi=0. When Aui<1, from Lemma 3 (ii)(a), psi and pui are determined as in Lemma 1 (ii)
and thus Proposition 1 (ii), since s
¡
FiNi
FiNi+psjHjNj
¢
< Asihs¡Auihu¡(1+r)ch
Asihs¡Auihu <
(Asi¡1)hs+(1¡Aui)hu
Asihs¡Auihu .
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